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ABSTRACT 
 
Privatization Discontent and Its Determinants: 
Evidence from Latin America 
 
Privatization policy faces increasing popular opposition in Latin America. After a discussion of 
recent empirical literature on this topic, we ask two simple questions: Who are the people 
most dissatisfied with privatization? and: Why are they dissatisfied? To answer, we use social 
attitudes combined with objective controls at country level. The former include the results of 
three waves of Latinobarometro surveys (51,635 observations, 1998, 2000 and 2002, in 17 
countries). The latter include privatization data and macroeconomic variables. The data on 
country-specific experiences of privatization come from two different data-set. One data set 
exploits information about 340 divestitures occurred in Latin American countries, over the 
period 1990-2001. The second includes 923 infrastructure projects with private participation 
(including divestitures, concessions and other contracts) over the period 1984-2002. We test 
several empirical models and we find that disagreement with privatization is most likely when 
the respondent is poor, privatization was large and quick, involved a high proportion of public 
services as water and electricity, in countries where there is high inequality of incomes. A 
robust non-linear relationship between socio-economic status and dissatisfaction with 
privatization suggests that particularly middle-to-low income households, with a median level 
of nine years of education, perceive to have suffered from privatization. While misperceptions 
cannot be ruled out, this result is broadly consistent with recent empirical research in Latin 
America that points to distributional concerns in the implementation of privatization policy 
because of tariff rebalancing not adequately addressed by policy makers and regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades privatization in Latin America (LA), and the related (usually 
subsequent) market liberalization and regulatory reforms, were ubiquitous policies that changed the 
provision of public services for millions of users. Among developing countries, Latin America was 
the region where privatization started earlier and generated cash proceeds for the public budgets 
larger than in any other region (Lora, 2001). 
 
Despite the widespread consensus among policy-makers and international lenders1, and strong 
support by many economists (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003) privatization is however highly 
and increasingly unpopular in Latin America, as well documented by several independent surveys 
(Lora, Panizza, and Quispe-Agnoli, 2004). In this paper, after a review of some recent empirical 
literature on this topic, we ask two simple questions: Who are the people most dissatisfied with 
privatization? and: Why are they dissatisfied? To address these questions we use social attitudes 
data, combined with objective control variables at country level.  
According to strand of recent empirical research on welfare changes for consumers in Latin 
America (Ugaz and Waddams Price, 2003)2, distributive issues do play a role in the perception of 
the benefits and costs of privatization. We do not assume that respondents to surveys are always 
well informed, but we think that variations in their opinions, combined with objective control 
variables at individual and country level, including privatization characteristics, may be revealing 
about the information they consider. Thus, the paper focuses particularly on the contribution that 
the empirical analysis of subjective perceptions can offer as a complement to more traditional 
research on social welfare effects of policy reforms, typically based on household expenditure 
surveys, price trends, and other objective data.  
 
The following quotations from recent papers set our research questions in the context of the current 
policy debate on utility reform. 
 
“The supposed failure of privatization in Latin America has recently become the source of street 
riots, protest demonstrations, and adverse news coverage…These adverse opinions are not 
restricted to a handful of protesters. Latinobarometer opinion polls .. show that a clear majority 
disapprove of the privatization process, a pattern that is uniform across countries, age, gender and 
socioeconomic classes. The opinions appear to be becoming increasingly adverse over time…” 
(McKenzie and Mookherjee 2003,p.1-2); 
 
“There can be little doubt that mistakes have been made and promises not kept - but a good number 
are not. An argument can be made that the concrete outcomes of privatization have been better than 
people think, or that privatization may not be the actual cause of the real difficulties they perceive. 
Nonetheless, perceptions count greatly in and of themselves if they result in political opposition 
sufficient to slow, halt or reverse a process that would bring efficiency and growth gains to a 
society gains which could in principle be fairly shared using tax or other policy instruments.” 
(Birdsall and Nellis 2003, p.4); 
 
                                                 
1 According to Williamson (1990, 2000) privatization was a key ingredient of structural adjustment in Latin 
American in the framework of the Washington Consensus, i.e. the policy package advocated in the 1980s by the US 
Treasury, the IMF, the World Bank, and other international organizations.  
2 Most of the empirical privatization literature recurs to simple microeconomic performance indicators; particularly 
they focus on changes in labour productivity or in profitability (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Only a more limited set 
of authors explore social costs and benefits of privatization, and particularly their impact on prices and redistribution of 
welfare: examples are Galal et al (1994), Newbery and Pollitt (1997), La Porta and Lòpez-de-Silanes (1999), Florio 
(2004) and other contributions reviewed by Birdsall and Nellis (2003) . 
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“It is possible that due to data limitations and perhaps even methodological flaws, statistical 
models do not accurately measure the true welfare impact of these reforms. It is also possible that 
public perceptions are subject to systematic biases” (Kessides,2004, p.58).  
 
According to Kessides, empirical research should focus on the collection of comparable cross-
country micro-data on prices and consumption, in order to discover the true welfare changes 
following utility reforms. These detailed micro-data, however, are currently unavailable in Latin 
America and elsewhere (see http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/upp/respar.htm, for information 
on a new research project supported by the European Commission). In this paper we use a different, 
albeit complementary, research strategy. In fact, contrary to what is said by the first quotation 
above, we do observe sufficient variability in perceptions across countries and across a number of 
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, and we use this fact to explore possible 
determinants of perceived failures. 
 
Obviously we cannot rule out the suspect that respondents are uninformed and that they give the 
‘wrong answer’, as suggested by the second and third quotation. However, finding recurrent 
patterns across countries points to the existence of substantive phenomena, difficult to capture by 
using more aggregate data, e.g. about tariff or expenditure changes for the average consumer. 
Hence, we suggest that the analysis of subjective micro-information may contribute to the redesign 
of empirical research on actual measurable welfare changes and of policy reforms themselves, 
because micro data on perceptions show where problems are actually encountered, for example in 
which specific social groups.  
In this paper we explore social attitudes information available from Latinobarometro, an 
independent survey regularly performed every year on representative samples of 17 Latin American 
countries. A recurrently asked question is the following: “The privatization of state companies has 
been beneficial to the country?”. The sample summary results are reported in table 1. They show 
that more than half of the interviewees disagree with this claim, and the percentage has been 
increasing of almost 20 points over the three surveys we consider (1998, 2000 and 2002). The rising 
discontent with respect to privatization is certainly correlated with a change in general attitudes. In 
fact the country economic situation is perceived as somewhat worsened, and the confidence in the 
market has declined (see table 2). Nevertheless, simple inspection of the numbers seem to suggest 
that the change of attitudes towards privatization is more pronounced than other changes of 
perceptions, and we wish to test how far opposition to privatization is just a reflection of economic 
pessimism, or if it reflects additional concerns. 
 
[insert tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
We estimate various models predicting the attitudes towards privatisation. After controlling for 
usual demographics (gender, age, education, working condition) and general attitudes towards 
related issues (see items reported in table 2), we concentrate on the correlation between attitude 
towards privatization and social conditions of respondents (which is subjectively and objectively 
measured). We show that the strongest opposition originates from middle-to-low socio-economic 
strata in the population, which are not necessarily less educated than richer classes. We also take 
into account the economic environment by adding some macroeconomic controls at country level 
(gdp growth, public expenditure, income inequality and illiteracy rates) as well as information about 
privatization characteristics (composition by sector, timing, and amount of divestiture proceeds). 
We consider privatization features using two datasets: one data set (FEEM Privatizationbarometer, 
and Securities Data Corp., see above web citation) offers information about 340 divestitures 
occurred in Latin American countries, over the period 1990-2001. The second one (Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Database, see, http://ppi.worldbank.org/) includes 923 infrastructure 
projects with private participation (including divestitures, concessions and other contracts) over the 
 4
period 1984-2002. These data allow us to see the impact on attitudes of various privatization 
characteristics, including sector, type of contract, timing, share of utilities, etc). 
 
Our main finding is that the highest probability of disagreement with privatization is encountered 
when the respondent is secondary school educated, is middle or low in terms of socio-economic 
conditions, the privatization has involved a high proportion of public utilities (as water and 
electricity), and the country suffers high inequality in the distribution of incomes. There is some 
evidence that concessions or other public-private contracts are less unpopular than outright 
divestiture, while distressed contracts contribute to raising discontent. Our results are fairly robust 
within each survey and for most countries individually taken. We suggest that these findings depict 
a broadly consistent picture of privatization discontent that points to a combination of perceived 
distributive concerns, privatization features, and the economic environment that should be 
addressed by future research and policy design. 
 
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2, we discuss the conceptual framework on 
social benefits and costs of privatization, the possible relationship between objective and subjective 
evidence, and our research questions, along with some background history of different national 
models of reform, and earlier empirical research on the welfare impact of privatization in Latin 
America. In section 3, we present our data sources and empirical findings.  We conclude summing 
up our results, and their implications for further research and policy design. 
 
 
2. Social benefits and cost of privatization: theory and evidence in Latin America 
 
2.1 Welfare effects of reforms 
While we test perceptions, and not verifiable welfare changes, an analytical framework is helpful to 
understand how in principle the various agents can be affected by public divestitures. Among 
others, Drèze and Stern (1990), Jones et al. (1990), Galal et al. (1994), Newbery and Pollitt (1997),  
and Florio (2004) offer a detailed discussion of this issue. 
 
The social welfare change of a policy reform can be seen as the sum of the welfare changes of four 
individual types: consumers, taxpayers, shareholders and workers. There may be other agents 
involved if we consider for example the suppliers and competitors of privatized firms, or foreign 
investors, but the latter have usually less weight in the social welfare evaluation. Each term can be 
dealt with separately when we know how to estimate it from observable data.  
 
As for aggregation, given a social welfare function, e.g. of the Bergson-Samuelson type, one needs 
welfare weights to evaluate the change of welfare of respectively different consumers, taxpayers 
etc. Alternatively we need specific weights to evaluate the marginal impact of the change in welfare 
of group of representative consumers, tax-payers and so on. One should be careful however with the 
aggregation assumptions. Applied economists would like to have all the relevant information to 
make the appropriate calculations, and to understand the differential impact of a policy reform on 
specific group of agents and to estimate shadow prices for general equilibrium effects. These data 
are often not easily available.  Conjectures and prior beliefs unavoidably bias applied research on 
policy reforms. In turn, when an individual is asked whether in his or her opinion a reform was 
‘beneficial to the country’, the interviewer elicits a sort of very crude social cost-benefit assessment 
by the respondent. The concerned individual will partly answer on the basis of her direct 
experience, partly on her ideology and external factors. We discuss below some of the factors that 
in principle may influence the judgment of an observer of privatization. We focus particularly on 
consumers because the earlier research mentioned above show that they play the key role in the 
welfare evaluation of policy reforms. 
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Privatization3 may have a direct impact on consumers’ welfare, particularly through the divestiture 
of state-owned public utilities and other public services. Following privatization, consumers may 
experience several changes: 
- in their potential access to the network of utilities or to other public services (e.g. there is network 
expansion because of the release of investment constraints that affected the former state owned 
enterprises - SOEs henceforth - or a cut of services in some less profitable regions) 
- in the tariff structure (e.g. changes of access charges, fixed components of the tariff, prices per 
unit of service, payment method, tariff rebalancing among type of services)  
- in the quality of service (e.g. number of failures in telephone calls, breaks in delivery of water or 
electricity) 
- in the prices of substitute/complement goods (this is however less verifiable by the consumer). 
 
Each of these dimensions poses difficult challenges for empirical research on welfare changes. In 
principle we would need time series of individual micro-data and of related controls. Some of these 
data are available to the utilities, but are not in the public domain. Other data are available by 
official expenditure surveys, but their country coverage is uneven in Latin America and not 
comparable across countries. Aggregate information on the “average” consumer is not well suited 
for welfare analysis and may conceal redistributive impacts. We cite below some interesting 
evidence of such impacts following utility reform in Latin America, but overall objective evidence 
is patchy. 
 
Before moving to empirical evidence, let us consider why, in principle, the redistributive dimension 
of utility reform may be significant. In the aftermath of privatization, the poor (by income share or 
by source of income, e.g. pensioners) often suffer a risk of being net loser mainly because the 
abolition of cross-subsidies in the tariff structure. SOEs used implicit taxation of business users (or 
other high volume users) by charging higher tariffs, and the rent was then used to implicitly 
subsidize household users. Thus, in some countries SOEs deliberately distorted prices in such a way 
as to sell at prices below long run marginal costs (LRMC) to some types of users (e.g. residential 
users in water, telephone, transport, electricity and gas) and above LRMC to other types 
(particularly business users). In principle, if privatization generates the incentive for managers to 
devote more effort to decrease production costs, this efficiency shock may countervail the adverse 
redistribution impact, creating a positive-sum game (at least in absolute welfare terms). This Pareto-
improving reform is, however, unlikely under sustained market power of the incumbent, or under 
weak regulation, and adverse welfare redistribution may appear, at least for some initial years. 
Moreover, under poor regulatory framework, regressive price-discrimination substitutes for the 
previous pattern.  
 
Because of lack of appropriate data, some empirical research in this area risk often to miss the point 
when it has to assume “that all households were sold the same product at the same price”, in the 
words of McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003, p.4). The variability of welfare changes across social 
groups is, however, the key issue for the distributive impact of reforms in many sectors. 
 
In this paper we propose a complementary research strategy to the traditional welfare changes 
measurement. We assume here that consumers have at least some relevant information on access, 
quality, quantity and prices of the public services they use, before and after privatization. Hence, we 
assume that their attitudes on the social benefits of privatization depend at least partly upon this 
                                                 
3 ‘Privatization’ is here a synonym for a wide set of reforms including divestiture of state-owned enterprises, market 
liberalization and re-regulation. In fact the time sequence is often the above ordering. While privatization is a generic 
label for several reforms, in this paper we test the differential impact on social attitudes of outright divestitures of SOEs 
versus other contracts involving private finance, including concessions, lease and greenfield projects. 
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information, as upon several other factors as well. People may be uninformed about the overall 
welfare changes in the country, or general equilibrium effects, but we maintain that they are able to 
assess the relevant changes affecting their consumption expenditure. Still, agents may be wrong in 
gauging the exact extent of the change, but if perception errors are randomly distributed, the 
direction of change may be on average perceived correctly. One may of course make specific ad 
hoc assumptions on perception errors, e.g. assume that less educated people make more evaluation 
errors. We prefer to avoid such ad hoc assumptions, but we control social attitudes with education 
attainment, and several other individual characteristics. 
 
Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that when the actual (unobserved) welfare impact of 
privatization is regressive, a large number of the respondents in a social attitudes survey, 
particularly in countries with high income inequality,  will be critical of the reform, and support to 
privatization will decline with income or objective well-being of the respondents.4 As a 
consequence, a country with sizeable income inequality is more at risk of privatization discontent. 
The social aversion to inequality is probably not linear in inequality itself, and any reform perceived 
as regressive in countries where inequality is high may be unpopular (see Graham and Pettinato, 
2002, for a discussion of the relationship between subjective well-being and income profiles). 
Particularly important is the change of inequality over time . Worsening inequality can reinforce the 
perception that privatization may directly contribute to this process, or that the regressive 
consequences of privatization, albeit transitory, may be unbearable by those in the lower income 
brackets, especially when they have to face tariff rebalancing. 
 
Under this angle, we would also expect that the public support to privatization decreases when 
industries to be divested include a high proportion of utilities, because middle to low income 
consumers, accustomed to previously subsidized tariffs pay a non negligible share of their income 
in utilities bills.  In fact, the adverse redistribution effects, or related fears thereof, are more likely 
for public services, while the concern for selling state-owned manufacturing business, or financial 
services, is probably stronger among workers in those sectors, but probably not so important for the 
general public. 
 
An additional dimension of privatization discontent may be related to an excess of divestiture in 
short time. Under these circumstances long habits of consumers of public services are suddenly 
disturbed, and even if quality of services may gradually increase and their prices decreases, initial 
reactions to a shock may be negative from consumers. 
 
One important research question is about the various forms of privatization. Outright divestitures 
may be perceived as more welfare damaging by the poor than concessions or other forms of public-
private contracts, because the Government’s role in the latter case may be seen as stronger. This 
perception, however, may be disturbed by news of distressed concession contracts, and frequent 
renegotiation (Guash, 2004). 
 
                                                 
4 Under this angle survey data may be a complement (certainly not a substitute, however) to more traditional 
welfare analysis based on expenditure surveys or industry statistics. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, other 
social groups directly involved in the reforms are shareholders, workers, and taxpayers. Usually the first are winners 
(because of underpricing of shares at initial public offerings and residual market power of the incumbents), the second 
losers (because of overmanning in the SOEs), and the third are winners or losers depending on the specific fiscal 
choices of government (e.g. the use of privatization proceeds either to sustain public investment or current expenditures, 
or to redeem debt).  The welfare impact of such changes will be often regressive. Thus it is crucial to assess the welfare 
impact on consumers, because they outnumber the other groups in population and in the representative samples of 
social attitude surveys. A detailed discussion goes beyond the scope of the paper; see Drèze and Stern (1990) and Florio 
(2004). 
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Eventually, macroeconomic conditions may also influence these perceptions: if a country suffers 
macroeconomic shocks, respondents are more pessimistic on their future incomes and they may fear 
a privatization implying higher prices, cutting public services and/or creating the necessity to recur 
to costly substitutes. 
 
The above discussion sets some research questions to be tested empirically. They boil down to two 
more general questions: Who are the discontents? Why they disagree that privatization has been 
beneficial to their country? In the next section we present some features of privatization in Latin 
America that justify why the region seems to be a very suitable candidate to test our conjectures on 
both questions. 
 
 
2.2 National variations in privatization patterns in Latin America 
 
 The privatization process in Latin America in the ‘90s was part of a political and ideological trend 
common to most political parties from the right to the left (Murillo, 2002). This common trend 
showed, however, national variations: differences are related to the magnitude, velocity, depth and 
methodology of the privatization. This could give origin to different perceptions about privatization 
in each country, and we wish to exploit this variability in our research design. 
 
Regarding the scale of the process, important disparities exist between counties. The cumulative 
revenues of privatization during the period 1988-1999 were higher than 8% of GDP in four 
countries: Bolivia (19.7%), Peru (13.2%), Brazil (10.9%) and Argentina (8.6%), whereas they did 
not exceed 3% of GDP in Honduras, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Uruguay (Chong and 
López de Silanes, 2003; Lora, 2001; Lora and  Panizza, 2002). The fact that Chile is not among the 
most intense privatizers is partially due to the fact that it started earlier than the rest of the countries. 
Mexico was another earlier privatizer but the revenues in this first stage were not significant 
(McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003). 
 
As regards to the sectors that have been involved in the process, 75% of the value of privatization’s 
revenues came from utilities and infrastructure, the financial sector representing 11% and the rest 
came from oil, gas and manufacturing. Most of the countries privatized telecoms, electricity, gas, 
water and sanitation services. Privatization of railways, airlines, airports and highway were less 
extensive. Divestitures of financial and productive sectors were not so important because private 
participation was already present there. Additionally, most governments insisted on retaining one or 
more public banks and, except Argentina, governments opted for retaining under public control the 
companies connected with natural resources (such as oil, gas and copper). In contrast to Eastern 
Europe, divestitures in manufacturing was not important in Latin America, except for some old 
strategic heavy industries such as steel, aluminium and so on.5 
 
There is a common perception of Chile as a leading case in Latin America privatization, which is 
based more on the characteristics and extension of the process than in its depth. In this country, the 
state withdrew from social security, health and education systems but, simultaneously, retained 
ENAMI and Codelco (the most important player in the copper sector), the monopoly of the oil 
sector, the fourth commercial bank, the post, the railways and the ports. Thus, the share of SOEs in 
the GDP after privatization reaches 9%; which is higher than the average of LA countries (5%, 
                                                 
5 Although Brazil was one of the most important privatizers in the world, it retained state participation in electricity, 
the financial sector and oil (Anuatti-Neto et al, 2003). Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay were the only countries 
where telecoms were not privatized (Lora, 2001; Pombo and Ramírez, 2003). In Peru, which underwent one of the most 
intense divesture processes measured with respect to GDP, there has not been private involvement in transport, 
sanitation services and an important presence in agriculture is maintained by the state. 
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according to Fischer et al. , 2003). In contrast, Argentina did not retain the ownership of any 
important state company, with the exception of some national and provincial banks and some 
provincial companies of sanitation (Galiani et al., 2003). The cases of Mexico and Uruguay showed 
a very important role for the state-owned financial sector. In the former case it represented a 50% 
and in the latter 90% of total revenues. For most countries, privatization in energy represented a 
minimum of 20%, but in Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay practically nothing was privatized in that 
sector (Lora, 2001).6  
 
The strategy of privatization was also different among Latin American countries. Bolivia, Chile, 
México and Nicaragua privatized first the SOEs in the competitive sector (manufacturing and 
finance) and then, in a second phase, the utilities. Other countries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru sold both types of companies simultaneously. In some countries (Bolivia, Argentina) the 
monopolistic structure of some sectors was maintained in order to maximize the revenues, even in 
sectors like telecoms where the technology allowed more competition.  
 
The governments used different methodologies for selling SOEs to the private sector: total sale 
through open international options, public offering of shares, concession contracts, and direct 
transfers. The intensity in the use of each strategy differed across countries. Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru employed outright sales, while schemes of capitalization were used intensively in 
Bolivia (investors did not pay proceeds to the Treasury and committed themselves to sink capital in 
the companies). Concession contracts were mainly used in sanitation services, transport 
infrastructure and oil exploration and production, with rather unstable stories.7 There were also 
several attempts to ‘democratize’ the property, inviting small investors and workers to participate in 
the equity of companies. That common trend was especially intense in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile and Peru. But the most important strategy of capitalization was followed in Bolivia, where, as 
said,  no fiscal revenues from divesture were actually cashed by the state. However, as Anuatti-Neto 
et al. (2003) pointed out with respect to Brazil (and easily applicable to the rest of the countries) the 
governments neglected the opportunity to really diffuse ownership. 
 
Eventually, there is a particularly significant international dimension. In every country privatization 
implies important inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreigners participated not only with 
capital but also taking over company operations. In the entire region, FDI flows changed – in terms 
of GDP – from 0.3% in 1989 to 6.9% in 1999. Until the late eighties, most Latin American 
countries posed several barriers to foreign participation in services or strategic companies and the 
same happened with the remission of utilities. Once these restrictions were eliminated the 
privatization process played a key role in the attraction of foreign capital. According to Lora (2001), 
the 36% of FDI was directed to privatization.  
 
Overall, we can conclude that there is wide variation in national privatization patterns in Latin 
America, despite the broad common policy trend. This adds an interesting perspective to our 
research line. Had all Latin American countries followed an identical pattern of privatisation, 
potential variations in national attitudes towards privatisation would have been attributed to country 
specific compositional effects, without being able to identify which feature of the privatisation 
process may result most unpleasant to the majority of the population. On the contrary, since 
                                                 
6 Uruguay was the only country that did not privatize electricity, oil and telecoms. In general the rest has privatized 
al least one of these sectors (Lora, 2001). Additionally, Uruguay is the sole country where public opinion expressed 
their opposition to privatization of these companies in different referendums. No other country has shown this popular 
participation in the privatization debate. Nicaragua is a particular case; it was the only country in LA that to some extent 
represents a transition from a socialist economy to a market economy.  
7 Guasch (2001) says that in LA in the last 15 years, 40% of the concession contracts were renegotiated just 2.2 
years after. 
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countries followed a specific pattern, we can investigate whether there are systematic effects on the 
popularity of privatisation reforms. 
 
 
2.3 Existing empirical research on the redistribution effects of privatization 
 
Our discussion in section 2.1 suggests to consider the effects of access and price changes on income 
distribution and poverty as possible determinants of discontent, in addition to welfare effects on 
workers, tax-payers, and  shareholders. In order to analyse the impact of privatization in a cross-
country perspective we take advantage of several papers that cover nearly all the main country-
cases or give a cross-country evaluation of Latin America8 as a whole. 
Some studies suggest that privatization had positive effects on the poor through the budgetary and 
fiscal indirect effects, since in countries like Bolivia and Argentina privatized companies are now 
the main taxpayers (Chong and López de Silanes, 2003; Harris, 2003). Nellis (2003) argues that the 
budgetary effects are more important than sales proceeds and the regressive impact of underpricing. 
McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) remark the positive impact of fiscal revenues on stabilization 
policies. This helped disinflation that may benefit the relatively poorest people. Additionally, these 
revenues could have been used by the state to help the poor to compensate the negative effects of 
privatizations. Chong and López de Silanes (2003) assert that Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru 
are good examples where SOEs generated such big losses that privatization revenues and tax-
receipts were probably large enough to offset the social costs of job losses. On this line, see also 
Benitez, Chisari and Estache (2003) who use a general equilibrium model to show that privatization 
had progressive welfare effects. 
 
Having said this, it is still likely that microeconomic impacts of privatization are more direct and 
dominant in welfare terms, or at least in perceptions. It is beyond dispute, for example, that 
profitability increased everywhere after divestiture: more than 40% in Peru, Mexico and Argentina, 
but less than 10% in Brazil, Chile and Colombia (BID, 2002). The main reason behind these 
improvements in profitability was operating efficiency gains (Chong and López de Silanes, 2003). 
There were, however, social costs associated with such changes. In fact, downsizing was a key 
ingredient of companies restructuring (McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003). Except for Chile, the 
employment in SOEs was reduced at sizeable rates: 55% in Peru, 40% in Argentina, 36% in 
México, 23% in Colombia and 10% in Brazil, but in the long term there was a partial recovery of 
direct and indirect employment in privatized sector (BID, 2002). However, the reduction in staff 
was not big enough to become recognisable in the official unemployment rate or to explain the 
generalized deterioration of labour market indicators in most of the LA countries (Chong and López 
de Silanes, 2003). The conclusions from most of these papers are similar and in accordance with 
worldwide evidence (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Harris, 2003): privatization had positive impact 
regarding productivity, profitability, and fiscal revenues, but had some social costs in terms of 
employment.  
 
                                                 
8 McKenzie and Mookherjee (2002) present the main results of Ennis y Pinto (2002) for Argentina, Barja, 
McKenzie and Urquiola (2002) for Bolivia, López Calva and Rosellón (2002) for México, and Freije and Rivas (2002) 
for Nicaragua. More recent papers are reviewed in Chong and López de Silanes (2003). They present seven studies for 
different countries of Latin America (Argentina (Galiani et al, 2003), Bolivia (Garrón et al, 2003), Brazil (Anuattí-Neto 
et al, 2003), Chile (Fischer et al, 2003), Colombia (Pombo y Ramírez, 2003), Mexico (La Porta and López de Silanes, 
1999) and Peru (Torero, 2002)). The advantage of these studies is more comprehensive data sets. Harris (2003) and 
Megginson and Netter (2001) present worldwide evidence, including Latin America. Nellis et al (2004), is another 
general study that specifically tries to understand the gap among public perception and economic reality as described by 
empiric works. Other contributions are Chisari, Estache and Romero (1995), Estache, Gomez-Lobo and Leipziger 
(2000), Estache (2003), papers from WIDER and FLACSO (Azpiazu and Schorr, 2003). 
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When we focus on current research on direct welfare changes for consumers, scholars’ opinions are 
more divided and evidence more scattered. As mentioned in sub-section 2.1, the distributive impact 
of privatization depends on three main factors.9 The first one is the change in the access to services; 
it is related to the expansion of networks and the introduction of technological innovations that 
facilitate access, as in the case of telecoms. The second factor is the change in affordability, which 
is related to the tariffs rebalancing, the temporal evolution of prices and the way this affects the pre-
existing and new customers. Change in quality is important but difficult to measure, and we are not 
aware of comparable empirical research in this area across Latin American countries. 
 
Regarding the question of access to public services, namely electricity, telephone and water, 
McKenzie and Mookherje (2003) mantain that private participation contributed to an expansion of 
these services. Increased investment in the network could have contributed more intensively to the 
access of the poor to electricity. Their data source, however, do not allow for direct information on 
connections, in fact what they observe is increased expenditure or use: this do not allow for changes 
from illegal to legal connections. In the case of telephone services, given the lower earlier coverage, 
the network expansion benefited mainly the upper and middle classes. Ugaz and Price (2003) 
confirm this tendency of relative improvement of poor customer’s access. However, the deficit of 
connections continues to be high especially for sanitation services in urban areas and for all services 
in rural areas. According to Chisari, et al. (2001) the Latin America experience shows that the poor 
are the last in receiving the benefits of higher access generated by privatizations. For instance, the 
rural poor are normally omitted from the reform because of the low profitability of these areas. 
Rural regions in Bolivia, where most people are poor, are an example of this contrast with urban 
areas (Barja and Urquiola, 2001). 
 
Evidence about the impact of privatization on utilities tariffs is mixed. It depends, among other 
things, on the sector and on the country, the technological progress in the industry, how far prices 
were below cost-covering levels previous to privatization and, eventually, the regulatory 
framework. An example of critical assessment for the Argentinean case is the work of Azpiazu and 
Schorr (2003). These authors criticize the normative framework in which privatized companies 
operated. They consider the high level of prices at the beginning of private operations, the 
“regulatory delay” to translate the higher productivity gains into lower prices, the indexation of the 
domestic tariffs according to foreign inflation and the systematic practice of renegotiating contracts 
promoted by companies and validated by the government. They argue that the way in which the 
privatization process took place tended to create and preserve non-competitive markets. 
 
According to McKenzie and Mookherje (2003) the evolution of tariffs after privatization did not 
have a clear trend. They examine ten countries in Latin America and find five cases where they 
increase and five where they fall. Particularly, these country studies seem very sensitive to the fact 
that some government increased tariff before privatization. On the other hand, Ugaz (2002) remarks 
that privatization implied new tariff structures which was more cost-reflective. For the three 
countries she considers, she finds the same pattern of rebalancing: an increase in fixed charges and 
a decrease in variable unit prices. The magnitude of this relative change in tariff composition 
depends on both the previous degree of distortion and cross subsidies under public management. As 
a result of this tariff rebalancing, the pre-existing low-income customers and especially the poor 
were penalized with substantive losses in the consumer’s surplus. People in the bottom deciles of 
the income distribution suffer more intensively in absolute and relative (to their income) terms 
(Ugaz and Price, 2003). 
                                                 
9 The fourth factor we mentioned at the beginning of this section is the indirect impact on prices of other industries. 
This may be important but difficult to study and consumers are unlikely to have information on such general 
equilibrium effects. See Chisari, Estache and Romero (1995) for an earlier attempt to consider this impacts, and more 
recently Benitez, Chisari and Estache (2003). 
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Residential customers were more exposed to tariff increases than the commercial and industrial 
ones, particularly in countries where there were cross subsidies. In several cases, fixed charges 
represent a big portion with respect to the variable tariff component, such that the affordability 
problem for low users is very sensitive to connection charges (Chisari et al., 2001). In Peru, Chile 
and Argentina there was an increase in local calls tariffs that affected poor people more (Paredes, 
2001; Torero and Pascó-Font, 2001). In Bolivia, the rebalancing in electricity was harmful for low-
income household (Barja and Urquiola (2001). Anuatti-Netto et al (2003) show the same pattern for 
the Brazilian case in electricity and telecom. They remark the increase in minimum monthly fees 
for access to a line as a key redistributive issue.  
 
A paper that supports our conjecture about the occurrence of regressive redistribution is Delfino and 
Casarin (2003), who analyze the change in the consumer surplus in Argentina. The authors found 
that low-income households were particularly damaged because of the increases in fixed charges in 
the utilities. They consider the distributional impact associated with the privatization of telecoms, 
gas, water and sewerage in the Gran Buenos Aires area, comprising one third of the country’s 
population. The paper uses an official household expenditures survey data-set, with monthly data 
collected around 1996-1997 for 5000 households. The data-set includes information on income and 
expenditures, demographic and personal characteristics, availability and use of utility networks. 
Based on this information, they calculate a simple Marshallian surplus change, following Waddams 
Price and Hancock (1998), the ratio of these welfare changes to income by quintile, and sensitivity 
to various price elasticity values. We report some of their results for the most plausible elasticity 
assumptions in Table 3.  The table shows that for all four utilities together, the yearly surplus 
change was of 112 USD (at constant prices) for the 5th income quintile of consumers, but it was a 
net loss of 51 USD for the poorest quintile. According to our own recalculation, this is equivalent to 
a gain of 0,33 percent on annual income for the rich and a quite substantial loss of 1,3 per cent for 
the poor.10 As the table shows, the distribution of welfare changes is strictly regressive in money 
terms. Relative to income, the impact is even more significant. We suspect that, in terms of 
perceptions, while the net benefit for the two upper quintiles is probably negligible, and for the 
middle income group the impact is neutral (but for gas and water there are net losses), the negative 
impact of tariff changes cannot go unnoticed by the two bottom quintiles. For these relatively poor 
consumers, expenditure in utilities claims a high proportion of income, hence any price change is 
important. This not negligible reshuffle of welfare perhaps helps to explain why we find that the 
highest disagreement with privatization in our data is in Argentina.  
 
[insert table 3 about here] 
 
In a general overview Ugaz and Waddams Price (2003) confirm that in LA utilities’ tariffs 
increased very frequently and this affected the poor more, even if increased access data may suggest 
a more positive evaluation. The evidence, according to these authors, raises the question of the 
distributive impact of privatization on utilities and the effectiveness of regulation to protect poor 
consumers from monopoly power in most countries in Latin America. In fact, Kessides (2004) 
remarks that while overall privatization and liberalization have been beneficial to consumers in 
developing countries, policy makers and regulators too often did not find a balanced price structure 
in terms of the trade off between efficiency and equity objectives.  
To sum-up: first, the theoretical literature on social cost-benefit analysis of privatization does not 
reject the possibility of regressive welfare changes, not addressed by regulation or other policies; 
second, country variations in privatization policies are sizeable in Latin America, and this fact can 
be used to test subjective perceptions; third, while traditional empirical research, based on objective 
                                                 
10 Delfino and Casarin report an even higher loss, in the order of 2%, in their comment to these data. 
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data, supports the view of a positive impact of privatization on productivity, profitability, fiscal 
balance and perhaps on general equilibrium effects, the evidence on the impact on workers and 
consumers is more mixed. Given the evidence of large downsizing following divestitures, and of 
regressive tariff rebalancing in some countries and sectors, Latin America seems to offer a suitable 
laboratory to test whether income and objective well being influences social attitudes toward 
privatization, controlling for other individual characteristics; and to use country variability of 
privatization characteristics, controlling for macroeconomic conditions, to explore possible 
additional determinants of discontent. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Data 
Our social attitude data derive from LATINOBAROMETRO (www.latinobarometro.org) an annual 
independent survey carried out in several Latin American countries. The survey started in 8 
countries in the region in 1995 and extended to 17 countries in 1996. The waves we use were 
conducted in 1998 (November and December, except El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, which 
were surveyed in March 1998), 2000 (between January and March) and 2002 (during April and 
May).11 Sample sizes are approximately one thousand per country.12 In addition to usual 
demographic information (gender, age, educational attainment, occupational status, ownership of 
durables), the surveys contain some recurrent questions about current economic situation, scope for 
pro-market reforms and opinion about privatisation. We exploit some of these questions, in order to 
take into account the general attitudes of the interviewees. For example, we make use a question on 
the current situation of the country (“In general, how would you describe the present economic 
situation of the country? Would you say that it is very good, good, about average, bad, or very 
bad?”) in order to control for the degree of optimism/pessimism of the surveyed individual.13 We 
also (at least partially) control for potential ideological bias by using the expressed opinion on 
general economic issues (“The market economy is best for the country ?”).  
 
Our focus is the opinion of interviewees about the consequences of privatisation. In all three 
surveys there was the question  whether “The privatization of state companies has been beneficial to 
the country?”.14 According to the wording of the question, the interviewees were not asked whether 
the privatization was beneficial to them, but to the collectivity. Using the economists’ jargon, one 
could rephrase the question posed by the survey as “did the privatization raise the social welfare ?”. 
Even supposing that a man in the street may understand such a question, we could not expect a 
unanimous answer the question, because individuals not necessarily share the same value 
judgements about social welfare and the same information.  
This may explain why there is sizeable dispersion in public opinion with respect to the potential 
benefits of privatization, as reported in table 1. On average, two third of the population sample 
expressed against a beneficial role of privatization, and this opinion may be affected by several 
respondent’s characteristics (like age, gender, education, income, wealth, family composition). If 
this were the case, since these features are approximately similar across countries, we would have 
                                                 
11 We could not exploit more recent waves, since 2003 survey contains a standard question about privatisation, but 
does not report additional questions about market scope and role of the state, while 2004 survey does not ask a generic 
question about privatisation, but asks for an opinion about specific privatisations (water and electricity). 
12 More precisely: 17839 observations in 1996, 18038 in 1998 and 18522 in 2000. 
13 When available (in 2000 and 2002 only) we also consider the subjective evaluation of individual situation in terms of 
happiness (“Generally speaking, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?”). 
14 Panizza U. and M.Yañez 2003 analyses a larger data set from Latinbarometro including more survey years, but 
excluding the survey conducted in 2002. They follow a different line of research, since they are interested in 
investigating whether the attitude against privatisation could be accounted for a left-bias orientation of the respondents, 
and/or an increase in political activism. Our results are consistent with theirs in finding that favourable economic 
conditions reduce political opposition to privatisation. 
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expected an analogous distribution when considering the attitude within each country, if they 
explain most of the social attitudes.  
On the contrary, in table 4 we notice that there are wide variations across countries and years: the 
strong disagreement scores as high as 45.1% in Argentina in 2002 and as low as 2.73 in Guatemala 
in 1998, as well as the support hits the highest in Venezuela in 2000 (22.8%) and its lowest again in 
Argentina in 2002 (1.7%). This implies that we can exploit cross-country and cross-year variations 
in respondents’ opinions: if anything systematic survives once we control for sources of potential 
variations, we believe to have found robust factors.15  
 
[insert table 4 about here] 
 
Thus, the survey opinion about privatization is the outcome of both individual characteristics and 
country experiences. We can control for the former using available information from the survey, 
while for the latter we resort to aggregate evidence on the actual experience of privatization. By so 
doing, we gain insight on two issues: 
i) identify the population subgroup that is more fiercely opposing the privatization of state 
enterprise. As long as their judgment is dependent on their social position, these people are more 
likely to be the potential damaged from this experience. 
ii) classify the country privatization experiences according to their impact on social opinion, 
controlling for macroeconomic conditions, and ascertaining which are the features that create social 
discontent. 
  
As far as individual information available, we possess information about gender, age, marital status, 
educational attainment, employment condition, ownership of durables goods (colour TV, 
refrigerator, housing, computer, washing machine, telephone, car, second home, drinking water, hot 
water, sewage system) and self-assessed socio-economic status. Most of the information is 
summarized in this variable, as it can be grasped by table 5: a “very bad” socio-economic condition 
is typically associated with lack of proper housing (in the 42.7% of cases), drinking water at home 
(37.0% of cases), not to speak of car (89.0%) or computer (95.2%). At the opposite extreme, a 
“very good” condition is associated with ownership of colour TV set (97.5%), refrigerator (95.3%), 
drinking water (95.6%). Table A.3 in the Appendix analyses the correlation between the self-
assessed socio-economic status and its potential determinants. Rather surprisingly, the perception of 
deprivation is highest in the absence of electric/electronic appliances (TV, refrigerator, telephone, 
and, with the highest coefficient, on computers!) and car; more basic services related to sanitation 
(drinking water, sewage) score lower in the ranking. Even when we control for education of the 
interviewees (fifth to eighth columns) these perceptions are retained. The socio-economic status 
improves with educational attainment, whereas it declines for unemployed and salaried. 
 
[insert table 5 about here] 
 
3.2 Determinants of attitudes, or: what type of people are most dissatisfied with privatization? 
 
We now move to the analysis of individual determinants of the attitude towards privatization. We 
have coded our dependent variable (ATTITUDE) by assigning zero value to uncertain respondents, 
negative values to those expressing disagreement towards privatization (−2 ‘strongly disagree’, −1 
                                                 
15 Notice that the percentage of interviewees without a specific opinion varies significantly across countries, indicating 
that the issue of privatization is differently perceived. In table A.1 in the Appendix we report the estimates of the 
probability of non-reporting an opinion in the survey. We find that women, people without formal education and in a 
bad or very bad self-assessed socio-economic condition, are most likely to not report an opinion. Notice the statistical 
insignificance of variables reporting difficulties in understanding the question, or the interviewee lamenting dislike for 
economics. 
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‘somewhat disagree’), and symmetric positive values for the supporters of privatization. Table 6 
presents some descriptive statistics of our variable set, whereas in table A.4 in the Appendix the 
same variables are presented by country. Descriptive statistics indicate that half of the sample is 
made of women, with average age below 40 (youngest samples in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Peru). 
The respondents are head of family in half of cases. It is interesting to note that a large fraction of 
the population has enrolled but not completed different levels of educational attainment. Higher 
levels of education are recorded in Bolivia, Chile, Panama and Peru. The socio-economic level 
indicates the worst situations in Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. However there are different trends in 
the perception of socio-economic deprivation: while there is a clear deterioration in Bolivia, Peru 
and Nicaragua, a trend reversal is observed in Honduras and Mexico. By taking into account 
missing observations on some variables (mainly on employment conditions and/or marital status), 
we have 51.635 observations available. 
 
[insert table 6 about here] 
  
Table 7 reports our main findings, before using any objective control, and using two alternative 
estimators, least square (columns 1-3) and ordered probit (columns 4-6) under alternative 
specifications. Results are substantially identical in terms of sign and significance, and therefore we 
will comment ordered probit only.  
Among demographic characteristics, gender is never significant and age is the most significant, 
exhibiting a U-shaped pattern, with a computed age of minimum support equal to 50 (corresponding 
to the 77th percentile in age distribution). Similar pattern are observed for the years of education, 
with a minimum support for 7 years of education.16 However, given the institutional differences 
across country, we prefer a specification of the educational attainment using dummies (as done in 
columns 2-3-5-6). In this case a negative opinion about privatisation is most likely to come from 
middle-low level of educational attainment (highest among respondents with “uncompleted 
secondary education”, corresponding to a median value of 9 years of education).17 When looking at 
socio-economic condition, and having in mind that the excluded case is represented by respondents 
in “very good conditions”, we notice that support declines with the worsening of the condition, but 
in a non-linear way, since those expressing against a beneficial effect of privatization are those in a 
“bad” economic condition, while those in a “very bad” condition seem somewhat less affected. 
Employment status comes out statistically insignificant in most cases, even when taking into 
account the distinction between salaried in private and/or in public firms; only self-employed and 
housewives seem to be more supportive of privatization. Similarly, marital status is not particularly 
significant, except the case of single member families. In all regressions, we maintained as controls 
country and year fixed effect, city size (positive contribution of living in the capital) and month of 
interview. We also control for whether the interviewer noticed some dislike of the respondent with 
respect to economic questions, or whether the respondent lamented problems in understanding, 
without finding any significant effect. 
 
In order to control for individual heterogeneity, in the final column we have also inserted the 
answer provided on alternative questions: the more optimistic is the assessment of the country 
situation (“In general, how would you describe the present economic situation of the country? 
Would you say that it is very good, good, about average, bad, or very bad?”), the more encouraging 
                                                 
16 Panizza U. and M.Yañez 2003 claim that “...wealth is only weakly correlated with support for economic 
integration and education is weakly correlated with support for privatization and the free market in general”. However, 
despite they are using a dichotomous dependent variable and different survey years, even in their coefficient it is 
possible to recognise a U-shaped relationship between education and support to privatisation (table 4, column 3 in their 
paper). 
17 It is interesting to note that under the OLS specification, the strongest opposition is associated with “university 
completed”. An F-test for the identity of the coefficients of different educational attainment is rejected at 99%. 
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is the judgment about the effect of privatisation. Similarly, the opinions of the respondents are also 
correlated with their appraisal of market virtues (“The market economy is best for the country”): 
people believing that market economy is beneficial to the country are also convinced that 
privatization has been beneficial to their country, and vice versa. While these results are rather 
unsurprising, they indicate coherence in opinions of interviewees. In addition, they control for 
ideological bias of the respondents. If most of the opposition to privatization came from ideology 
and not from socio-economic status (and variations over time and/or across countries were the mere 
reflections of exogenous factors), then when controlling for other proxies for ideology, the 
correlation with socio-economic conditions should vanish.18 This does not occur in our results: 
other things being constant (age, gender, educational attainment, occupational status, and ideology), 
respondents in bad economic conditions express their strongest discontent to the economic 
consequences of privatization. 
 
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
We have explored the interaction between educational attainment and socio-economic level, finding 
that all educational levels report a peak in dissatisfaction (“uncompleted tertiary education” for 
those in “very bad” or “bad” socio-economic condition, “completed primary” for those in “average” 
conditions, and “uncompleted secondary” for those in “good” and “very good” socio-economic 
conditions - all coefficients are statistically significant). In figure 1 we show the estimated impact of 
the interaction dummies (relative to the case of an illiterate in very good conditions, the excluded 
case): it can be seen that those who claim that privatization of state enterprises have not been 
beneficial to the country are sufficiently educated individuals, and their dissatisfaction increases 
with the decline of their (perceived) socio-economic condition. While in the case of illiterate 
persons we could always think of wrong perception, this conjecture is weakened when considering 
people who have enrolled secondary education or even university.  
 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
3.3 The role of privatization features, or: Why some respondents are more dissatisfied than 
others ?  
 
In previous section we have identified potential opponents to privatisation, but we are still far away 
from explaining their dissatisfaction. The combined analysis of socio-economic status and 
educational attainment suggests that we have to look among the shrinking Latin-American middle-
to-low class, who may have suffered more than other social strata for the price change induced by 
privatization (see for example the population shares by country and years reported in table A.2). 
 
Survey data do not provide obviously direct answers about the reasons for dissatisfaction, and 
therefore we need to resort to indirect evidence. Among potential reasons for dissatisfaction that we 
have discussed in section 2, we may consider at least three aspects: 
i) respondents as workers are dissatisfied because the increased exposition to the risk of 
unemployment, due to the increased competition in the product and service market; 
ii) respondents as consumers are dissatisfied because the increased price of services provided by 
privatized enterprises has reduced their command in the market; 
                                                 
18 In table A.5 in the Appendix we provide some further robustness checks. In addition to estimating OLS and ordered 
probit model year by year, we also add additional answers available on specific years: “The State should leave 
economic activity to the private sector” (available in 1998 and 2002) and “Generally speaking, would you say you are 
very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?” (available in 2000 and 2002). In all cases, while the effect 
of educational attainments attenuate, the correlation with socio-economic conditions remains significant, with the 
strongest effect associated with the “Bad” outcome.  
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iii) respondents as citizens are dissatisfied because they (rightly or wrongly) believe that 
privatisation has reduced country competitiveness and/or has increased social inequality. 
 
With respect to point i), we have already alluded to the fact that employment condition is weakly 
correlated with opposition to privatisation. In particular we would have expected public employees 
to be more exposed to the risk of redundancies, and therefore to express greater discontent, but we 
do not find any statistically significant effect. In addition, also unemployed could express some 
worry about the negative spill-over on their employability chances, but we do not find statistically 
significant effects (see the coefficients associated to employment status in table 7 and table A.4). 
 
Similarly, point iii) is partially accounted for, when we notice that the opposition is stronger among 
those who believe that their countries are in a “bad” or “very bad” condition. The very same people 
also consider that market solutions are detrimental to the country, and that the state should take 
responsibility of (part of) the productive sector (see again the coefficients associated to different 
answers on questions about beliefs in table 7 and especially table A.4). There are therefore people 
with different worldviews in the sample, and part of the opposition may derive from the presence of 
“anti-market” ideology, which is widespread in Latin America. However, by controlling for country 
and year fixed effects, we are implicitly taking into account any systematic effects that are out of 
control of individual respondents (as it is the case for ideology, fashions and religious faiths, which 
can be systematically different across countries, and can also fluctuates over years). 
 
This obviously does not solve the issue whether the respondents are using a right or a wrong model 
of the reality in producing their opinion about the consequences of privatisation. We believe that it 
is impossible to provide a definite answer to this question, especially because the “true” model 
could be state-dependent (and therefore a rich and a poor person could be both right in expressing 
opposite opinion about privatisation, without being proved false when measuring their welfare 
changes). But we are more interested in whether the discontent can be manipulated by the policy 
maker, which corresponds to the question whether these opinions exhibit any systematic 
component, or whether they are idiosyncratic in the population (the truth probably lying in between 
these two extremes). On one hand, following a materialistic line of reasoning, one could be tempted 
to accept the idea that political opinions are the mere reflection of class position: in such a case 
socio-economic conditions and beliefs would be (perfectly) collinear, and one could be in trouble in 
identifying significant correlations. On the other hand, if beliefs were randomly distributed in the 
population, then controlling for opinions on related issues plays the role of proxy for unobservable 
components. Under the former extreme interpretation, discontent increases as long as the income 
distribution worsens, while in the latter extreme interpretation discontent should remain 
approximately constant across countries and/or years. We believe to have been able to prove in the 
previous section that, given the joint statistical significance of socio-economic conditions and 
respondents’ opinions, part of the increased opposition arise from the perceived worsening of the 
economic condition of specific groups of the population, independently of their ideological 
orientation. 
 
We are now to consider case ii), where the respondent may oppose privatisation because of its 
impact on consumption opportunities. We will explore this aspect in the remaining of this section. 
Let us begin with exploiting information available in the data-set about the ownership of durables 
commodities, which implicitly tells us something about consumption styles. We have grouped the 
commodities in accordance of the type of services they provide: proper sheltering for BASIC goods 
(items are housing, drinking water, hot water and sewage), easier housekeeping for ELECTRIC 
appliances (colour TV set, refrigerator, washing machine and telephone) and showing off for 
LUXURY goods (computer, car and second home). Given the nature of the original question, we have 
coded the variables as the absence of one or more item within each group, thus identifying the 
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extent of deprivation with respect to potential consumption styles. Overall, only a happy few 3.3% 
of the sample records a simultaneously zero value on all three groups of durable deprivations. 
 
[insert table 8 about here] 
 
If we interact these measures of deprivation with grouped educational attainments and re-estimate a 
model analogous to those reported in table 7, we obtain the picture reported in figure 2: the heaviest 
judgment comes from either people who need basic durables (like water or housing) or lack of 
either car, computer or holiday house. Thus we infer that there is an element of real need and 
contemporaneously an element of social envy that underlie the judgment about privatization. This 
matches with the estimates shown in figure 1: respondents in very bad conditions (i.e. lacking of 
basic durables) with university education probably suffer more deeply from deprivation, since they 
do not achieve a social role associated with their level of education. They have been unable to take 
advantage of potential benefits from privatization, since they do not have electric appliances, they 
do not travel and they cannot afford a telephone bill. Since privatization did not offer an improved 
economic prospect, they have a negative opinion about it. On the other side, there are a group that 
we would label as “middle class”, who enjoy an average socio-economic condition, even if they still 
do not have access to luxury goods like a car, a computer or even a second house. They probably 
took advantage of different prices brought in by privatization, but they could not participate to the 
capital gain associated with most privatization. In their perception, privatization could be harmful to 
the country because instead of redistributing wealth to the rest of the country, retained the control in 
the hands of the “happy few”. 
[insert figure 2 about here] 
 
This is the picture that emerges using information available at individual level. However people in 
different countries hold different experiences in terms of privatization, as we have discussed in 
section 2. In individual data this is partially taken into account by country/year fixed effect, which 
nonetheless are left unexplained. Suppose for example that one country (say Argentina) experienced 
prolonged privatisation, which involved from the very beginning public utilities, while another 
country (say Bolivia) followed a different strategy, by privatising natural resources at the beginning 
of the sample period, and then slowing down the process. If the first strategy creates more 
(perceived) discontent in the population, this should reflect in the econometrics by finding a 
stronger negative country fixed effect for the first country than for the second one.19 If we possess 
information related to country specific experiences of privatisation, we can investigate whether 
these specific features may have any impact on the average attitude of the local population (keeping 
constant other characteristics of the population by using adequate controls).20 For this reason we 
have resorted to existing data on privatization features. 
 
The data on country-specific experiences of privatization come from two different data-sets. One 
data set exploits information about nearly 340 events of privatisation occurred in Latin American 
                                                 
19 Using the specification proposed in last column of table 6, the Argentina fixed effects are 0.25**, -0.988*** and -
0.909*** (respectively for 1998, 2000 and 2002), while the corresponding coefficient for Bolivia are 0.649***, -
0.576*** and -0.322***. 
20 From an econometric point of view we face two alternatives: either we follow a two stage procedure (that is, we 
obtain estimate of country/year fixed effects from the model of table 7 – first stage – and then we regress these fixed 
effect on country/year specific information about privatisation), or we replace country/year fixed effect with 
information about privatisation in individual data analysis. Since aggregate data regressions reduce measurement errors 
(i.e. individual heterogeneity in opinions), but induce an upward bias in the estimated coefficients, we have preferred 
the second alternative. 
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countries, obtained from FEEM and Securities Data Corporations data over the period 1990-2001.21 
The second includes 923 investment projects over the period 1984-2002 collected by the World 
Bank.22 
 
From the former data-set we were able to look at the dynamics of privatization: number of events, 
initial and final year, duration (in months), frequency (obtained as result of number of 
events/duration). We also computed the economic significance of privatization (proxied by the 
across year average of the ratio between total proceedings from privatisation and gross domestic 
product) as well as the share of proceedings obtained from privazising public utilities (electricity, 
gas, water and sanitation)23 in total privatization proceedings (here again taking the averages across 
years). From the PPI World Bank data-set we obtain information about the nature of the 
privatization process in the broader meaning of private participation in the provision of public 
services (whether through contracts - concessions, management and lease contracts, greenfield 
projects – or through divestitures), the financial involvement of the private sector (whether limited 
to purchase of government assets or involving additional private investment in new facilities) and 
whether the project is operational or distressed. Given our focus on population attitudes, we 
restricted our data to projects involving utilities (Energy, Transport, Telecom, Water and 
Sewerage). 
 
Using these variables, we can test whether effectively the hostility towards privatization is heavier 
in countries where people perceived it from basic items like electricity or water supplies. In addition 
we also add country macroeconomic controls: the growth rate of gross domestic product 
experienced by the country in the years preceding the surveys, a measure of the role of government 
in the economy (proxied by the general government final consumption expenditure as percentage of 
the GDP), a measure of income inequality (the Gini index on income distribution), a measure of 
deprivation (the illiteracy rate in the adult population, which typically correlates with other 
measures like the child mortality rate).24 Table 9 reports evidence on these variables for countries 
and three sub periods preceding the surveys (1990-97, 1998-99 and 2000-1). Graphical inspection 
of these data suggests for example that the adversarial attitude toward privatisation declines with 
the increase in the growth rate of GDP.25 This is perhaps indicative of potential misinterpretation of 
the data in the absence of proper individual controls. Growth may reduce opposition towards 
privatization simply because of compositional effects (the population gets richer, and we know 
from previous results that dissatisfaction decline with improvement in the socio-economic status), 
or because it is perceived as one of the outcome of privatisation (which can be controlled by 
including individual opinion about the country situation), or just because it represents a 
confounding factor for the public opinion. As long as we are able to control for individual 
determinants (educational attainment – correlated with the ability of comprehension of the reality, 
family socio-economic status, understanding of the situation, degree of optimism), the (average) 
opinion expressed by the population should represent a “pure” judgment of the privatization 
experience, which can also be correlated with country specific features. Table 10 reports 
information from the PPI data-set. We have computed four ratios, which are informative of the 
                                                 
21 This data set draws from Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei elaborations on Securities Data Corporations data, kindly 
made available to us by Bernardo Bortolotti (FEEM and University of Turin). Unfortunately, there were no data with 
respect to Nicaragua and Costa-Rica, and therefore we are forced to leave these countries out of the sample henceforth. 
22 Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, The World Bank Group, contains additional information on other 
countries, and a greater detail in terms of years and of sectors. We have aggregated the data in three waves, four sectors, 
and in the countries we are interested in. 
23 Defined by SIC codes 4911-4922-4923-4924-4941-4959.  
24 All these control variables are obtained from the World Tables, published by the World Bank. 
25 Similar effects have been noticed in Panizza U. and M.Yañez 2003, where they use the output gap as cyclical 
indicator. 
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nature of the privatization process. Either using the number of episodes or the funds involved, we 
have considered: 
- the share of privatization through divestiture (which was high in the initial years, and then 
declined to zero, because of the increasing role of other private initiatives, such as concessions), 
- the share of projects which resulted problematic (e.g. concessions cancelled: a limited overall 
fraction, below 10%, but probably very damaging in terms of reputation of the policy)  
- the share of the purchase of governmental assets over the total private investment in 
infrastructure  
- the share in utilities privatization due to water and to electricity (approximately one fourth in 
each case). 
 
[insert tables 9 and 10 about here] 
  
We present ordered probit estimates, weighed on sample weights and clustered errors by country in 
tables 11 and 12, making use subsequently of the first or the second dataset on privatization features 
respectively. The first column of table 11 replicates our previous results, corresponding to the final 
column of table 6 with the exclusion of two countries (Costa Rica and Nicaragua – observations 
decline from 50.242 to 44.808). Opposition to privatization is non-linearly related with educational 
attainment and with socio-economic status, peaking for individual with “uncompleted secondary 
education” and “bad” socio-economic status. In the second column of table 11 we introduce macro-
economic controls, recording greater opposition in countries where the public sector is larger (as 
proxied by the share of public expenditure on GDP). The third column introduces information about 
the features of the privatization process: (the probability of) support to privatisation declines 
whenever privatisation episodes are more recent (as captured by the ending date) and tend to span 
over a longer time interval (as captured by the duration measure).  
When we combine the elements of second and third column in fourth column and we add some 
interactions, we obtain additional insights. While the share of privatization covering public utilities 
was statistically insignificant if considered alone, it becomes significant if interacted with a measure 
of income inequality. Since the sample average of the Gini index on income inequality is 
approximately ½, this implies that privatisation of public utilities gain support in relatively 
egalitarian countries26, while it raises discontent whenever the social situation is plagued by strong 
disparities. Notice that now opposition tend to be stronger whenever the size of the privatization 
increases (as proxied by the incidence of the proceeds of privatization over the GDP). When 
considering additional interaction between individual characteristics (the socio-economic status and 
the proposed measures of deprivation), we find that privatization of public utilities is associated 
with dissatisfaction whenever individual deprivation (especially in “luxury” commodities) is higher. 
The three final columns re-estimate the final model by yearly sub samples. 
 
Analogous structure is maintained in table 12, where the Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Database is used to characterise privatization in a broader meaning, allowing us to discriminate 
between divestitures and other contracts. The first two columns just replicate the first two columns 
of table 11 for ease of comparison. When we introduce privatization features in third column, we 
observe that support to privatization tends to be lower when the involvement of the private finance 
is more limited, either because the government retains control (and therefore the share of divestiture 
is lower) or because the private sector limits its participation to the acquisition of government 
assets.27 However these effects are average effects, that need some interpretation.  When we look at 
each single wave we notice that the effect of divestiture reversed sign in the 1998 and 2000 surveys 
(remember that the index was constructed by considering privatization events over the 1984-1998 
                                                 
26 Namely countries with a Gini index below 0.56 (obtained from 2.04/3.59). 
27 Similar results are obtained when considering the number of cases instead of funds invested. Available from the 
authors. 
 20
interval). It is also interesting to notice that the share of problematic privatization is not statistically 
significant on average, but has a growing and negative sign when considering yearly estimates. It 
seems as if the public opinion had learnt to distinguish between different types of privatization. 
Initially respondents somewhat preferred concessions to divestitures, probably because they 
believed (rightly or wrongly) that the government would have maintained some control. With time 
passing on, the emergence of some cases of failed privatization, the end of public asset selling (as 
witnessed by the decline of the coefficient on the corresponding variable), there have been a 
reversal of attitude, with greater favour to private initiative than divestitures. When we look at the 
effect of composition of utility privatization (fourth column of table 12), we notice that discontent is 
increasing with the share of water and sewerage privatized services, and this effect is stronger the 
higher is income inequality. This is reinforced at individual level, since we show that privatization 
of water services induces more fierce opposition among those suffering deprivation of basic items 
(among which water and sewage at home). Similarly, privatization of electricity raises discontent 
among those deprived of electric appliances. 
  
Overall our results can be summarised as follows. The bulk of the opposition to privatization 
derives from middle-to-low social strata, with sufficient access to information, given their level of 
education (9 years of schooling on average). This result is robust against individual heterogeneity in 
perception and/or ideology, and survives even when controlling for country differences in their 
experience with privatisation.28 We also find evidence of short-sightedness in the population: the 
opposition is higher when privatization ended more recently and/or lasted more months and/or was 
less frequent. This seems consistent with the idea of fading memory in the public opinion. Evidence 
of persistent attitudes can explain the negative correlation with public expenditure: populations who 
were accustomed to widespread intervention of the state in the economy are more reactive to the 
process of privatizing SOEs. We also find evidence of changing attitude in the public opinion, 
which seems gradually supporting the private finance initiatives. Finally, privatization of public 
utilities has a negative effect, depending on the pre-existing social situation. It is reasonable to 
assume that high inequality countries have a larger mass of pre-existing discontent. In this 
framework, privatization of public utilities may exacerbate social disparities, and contributes to 
dissatisfaction with privatization. The existence of basic deprivation and/or some sort of social envy 
phenomena (as witnessed by the correlation with deprivation in durable commodities) reinforces 
this interpretation. 
 
[insert tables 11  and 12 about here] 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has offered new evidence on privatization discontent in Latin America. Since 
privatization is basically a change of ownership from taxpayers to private shareholders, it 
redistributes well-being among taxpayers, consumers, shareholders and workers. As such, it has to 
be considered a highly socially sensitive policy, to be carefully managed by the regulatory 
framework. Given the absence of suitable objective data at cross-country level, we turn to the 
assessment of individual agents. They offer, in a crude and perhaps biased way, the perceived  
                                                 
28 As a further robustness check, in table A.6 we have restimated the model country by country, finding evidence of 
a non-linear relationship between support to privatisation and socio-economic status. However the peak of opposition 
changes from country to country: restricting to statistically significant coefficients, it consists of individuals in “bad” 
conditions in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, while the strongest opposition from 
individual in “average” conditions is found in Columbia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala. In the case of Honduras 
opposition comes from individuals in “very bad” conditions, while for Nicaragua and Uruguay it derives from people in 
“good” conditions. 
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change in the social welfare. We take this information seriously, not as a substitute, rather as a 
complement to more traditional applied welfare economics evaluation, and we try to distil lessons 
from what respondents say, exploiting several data sets: 
1. three large surveys comprising  more than 51,000 individuals, expressing their opinion about the 
consequences of privatisation at country level, as well as judgemenst over the country situation 
and the virtues of the market; for each interviewee we have information about several individual 
characteristics (including demographic data, education, occupation, durables owned, residence, 
language spoken) which we can control for. 
2. two databases on specific divestiture/concession events in the countries we study 
3. selected  macroeconomic variables. 
 
We combine subjective evidence (attitude towards privatisation) from the first type of data with 
more objective information at country level (macroeconomic controls, features of privatization 
within the country).  
Our key findings are the following ones: 
a) disagreement with privatisation is non-linearly related with educational attainment and with 
socio-economic status, peaking for individual with “uncompleted secondary education” and 
“bad” socio-economic status. This results points to the frustration of the low-middle classes 
b) countries where the public sector is relatively larger are those that record more opposition, 
probably because of the perceived role of the state in the provision of services and 
uncertainty about the role of the new private owners. 
c)  support to privatization declines over time, after controlling for other macroeconomic 
trends,  recent and long privatization processes raise more disagreement 
d) privatization discontent is higher when there is an interaction between income inequality in 
the country and a relatively large proportion of utilities among the government assets 
divested. Privatisation of public utilities is associated with dissatisfaction whenever 
individual deprivation is higher, particularly looking at deprivation of ‘luxury’ goods, a 
results that again points to the frustration of segments of the middle-to-low classes. 
e) respondents tend to dislike privatization more when the private sector commits relatively 
limited resources in the infrastructure investment, and plays more the role of buyer of 
divested assets than of active investor in private finance initiatives for creating new 
infrastructure 
f) the relatively limited number, but probably highly visible, distressed contracts in the public 
utilities,  induce an increasing disagreement over time. This points to a learning effect, with 
a gradual shift of opinion in favour of public-private partnerships or other contracts versus 
divestitures 
g) water and sewerage privatized services raise the highest concern, and this effect is stronger 
the higher is income inequality in the country. Privatization of water services induces more 
fierce opposition among those suffering deprivation of basic items, while privatization of 
electricity raises discontent among those deprived of electric appliances. 
  
Given the robustness of our finding with respect to social status of the respondents (after controlling 
for macroeconomic trends, and a number of subjective and economic environment variables), and 
going back to our discussion in the second section, we believe that middle-to-low social status 
individuals are those who perceive to have suffered most from privatization, particularly of utilities. 
This result indirectly confirms empirical research at country level, cited in Section 2, that points to 
regulatory or policy failures in addressing the distributional impact of privatization in Latin 
America.  
 
Some authors, may claim that in spite of these findings, privatization was beneficial to the poor, and 
perceptions are mistaken. Given the information available, we are unable to measure which fraction 
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of the perceived loss corresponds to actual damage (i.e. it could be converted in monetary terms, 
and in principle being compensated) and which fraction corresponds just to an imperfect (or even 
false) perception of damage. We suggest, however, that the non-linear relationship between social 
discontent and socio-economic status (which survive at country/year sub-sample estimation, and a 
large set of controls) could not be accounted by a mere false perception of welfare loss. Some 
components of misperception exist in the data, as witnessed by the “fading memory” of the 
respondents, but the overall picture is consistent enough and cannot be dismissed just as a collective 
illusion. 
 
Given the effects of country specific features of privatization, we can summarize our findings in a 
“recipe” for a successful privatization. First of all, a starting pre-condition is a limited amount of 
income inequality, which restrains the amount of people suffering from reduced access/higher cost 
of public utilities. Second, get people acquainted with privatization as much as possible, following a 
gradual approach (better privatizing in chunks than in a single event). Third, choose an 
expansionary phase, where output growth compensates for other adverse shocks. Fourth, be careful 
about the divestiture of public utilities, particularly of water and electicity services, especially 
where the deprivation of the relatively educated middle classes make the perception of the 
consequences of privatization more acute. Fifth, and last, turn to alternative ways to attract private 
finance in the management of infrastructure, and pay attention to the regulatory framework to 
address the distributive impact of tariff rebalancing. 
 
Conversely, a recipe for troubles and discontent, includes a large and quick divestiture plan, with a 
high proportion of socially sensitive public services, in a country with high income inequality and 
suffering adverse macroeconomic shocks, with relatively high educational attainment levels in the 
population. Our view is that in Latin America these ingredients were often present in many 
countries, and have contributed to a wide shift in public opinion against privatization. The fact that 
it is not just the very poor, but a substantial fraction of the middle classes, who perceive to lose 
from reforms and new market circumstances, is consistent  with a strand of research on individual 
happiness in developing economies (Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato, 
2005; Graham and Felton, 2005). The privatization story in Latin America reinforces the view that 
decision-makers, regulators, and applied economists, should consider detailed information on 
individual welfare changes and redistribution profiles in the context of policy reform, and design 
suitable interventions targeted to counteract regressive social impacts.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 – Attitude towards privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
 
1998 2000 2002 entire sample Privatization has been 
beneficial to the 
country 
indiv % indiv % indiv % indiv % 
strongly disagree 2.382 13.35 3.570 19.79 4.441 23.98 10.393 19.11 
somewhat disagree 5.417 30.37 6.684 37.06 6.993 37.76 19.094 35.10 
don’t know 1.354 7.59 1.202 6.66 1.271 6.86 3.827 7.04 
somewhat agree 6.260 35.09 4.577 25.37 3.781 20.41 14.618 26.87 
strongly agree 1.992 11.17 1.832 10.16 1.573 8.49 5.397 9.92 
non respondent 434 2.43 173 0.96 463 2.50 1.070 1.97 
Total 17.839 100.00 18.038 100.00 18.522 100.00 54.399 100.00 
 
Table 2 –Other related social attitudes – percent – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
 
How would you describe the present economic 
situation of the country? 
1998 2000 2002 
Very Bad 17.51 15.88 20.43 
Bad 34.72 35.67 36.40 
About average 38.88 39.07 35.42 
Good 7.50 8.02 6.97 
Very Good 1.39 1.36 0.78 
 
The market economy is best for the country. 1998 2000 2002 
strongly disagree 4.55 8.57 8.01 
somewhat disagree 15.75 19.86 17.81 
don’t know 10.78 13.24 12.85 
somewhat agree 48.05 40.01 44.13 
strongly agree 20.87 18.32 17.20 
 
The State should leave economic activity to the 
private sector. 
1998 2000 2002 
strongly disagree 10.34 n.a. 17.37 
somewhat disagree 30.75 n.a. 37.48 
don’t know 6.85 n.a. 7.91 
somewhat agree 37.56 n.a. 27.80 
strongly agree 14.50 n.a. 9.44 
 
 
Table 3 – Changes in consumer surplus - Argentina - USD (1999) 
 
Income group Telecoms Electricity Gas Water and 
sewerage 
Total 
 DS DS/Y DS DS/Y DS DS/Y DS DS/Y DS DS/Y E/Y 
Average 70.6 0.33 29.2 0.12 -22.8 -0.16 -48.6 -0.10 28.4 0.18 7.6 
1stquintile(poorest) 9.6 0.27 -0.4 -0.06 -15.2 -0.35 -45.8 -1.85 -51.8 -1.27 16.7 
2ndquintile 30.1 0.31 14.6 0.15 -18.5 -0.20 -47.2 -0.97 -21 -0.27 9.6 
3rdquintile 54.8 0.39 26.9 0.19 -21.6 -0.15 -48.1 -0.66 12 0.00 7.0 
4thquintile 75.5 0.35 39.6 0.19 -24.2 -0.11 -48.3 -0.44 42.3 0.25 5.3 
5thquintile(richest) 131.5 0.30 61.5 0.15 -29.5 -0.07 -51.15 -0.22 112 0.33 3.4 
Source: adapted from Delfino and Casarin (2003,tab. 7.2, p.161 and tab 7.3, p. 165) and our own calculations (total 
impact). Tariffs at December 1999, USD, before taxes, consumption data 1996-97 from Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Censos, Statistical yearbook, Buenos Aires 2000. DS = E1 [(P1-P2)/P1] [1+0,5 ε [ (P1-P2)/P1]], where E1 is 
initial expenditure level, E2 final expenditure level, Y adjusted household income, ε price elasticity (assumed to be –1 
for telecoms, -0,5 for electricity and gas, and 0 for water and sewerage in the reference scenario).  
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Table 4 – Attitude towards privatization: "The privatisation of state companies has been beneficial 
to the country" by country and years – percent – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
Country  strongly 
disagree 
somewhat 
disagree uncertain 
somewhat 
agree strongly agree 
number of 
observations 
1998 21.43 27.72 10.71 33.42 6.72 1176
2000 36.03 31.94 4.42 20.43 7.17 1199
Argentina 
2002 45.16 38.81 2.34 11.94 1.75 1198
1998 10.25 30.09 5.39 43.23 11.04 761
2000 16.26 42.29 6.41 27.79 7.25 1076
Bolivia 
2002 18.16 53.91 3.91 19.38 4.64 1228
1998 8.82 35.80 5.68 37.53 12.17 986
2000 25.97 35.85 5.50 24.44 8.25 982
Brasil 
2002 38.22 14.14 8.91 22.23 16.50 976
1998 12.59 28.55 8.23 39.04 11.59 1191
2000 18.28 39.71 7.65 29.00 5.36 1176
Chile 
2002 22.89 45.61 5.91 21.03 4.56 1184
1998 17.25 35.10 7.77 28.27 11.61 1171
2000 27.57 34.59 6.52 24.39 6.93 1197
Colombia 
2002 25.85 38.77 12.66 18.39 4.34 1153
1998 7.33 21.05 9.08 51.91 10.63 969
2000 13.04 37.01 9.67 25.45 14.83 951
Costarica 
2002 13.99 40.35 13.28 24.62 7.76 979
1998 10.59 30.38 5.03 38.89 15.10 1152
2000 13.71 39.85 6.18 29.02 11.25 1182
Ecuador 
2002 18.43 31.57 4.58 32.44 12.98 1156
1998 11.52 32.42 1.92 37.37 16.77 990
2000 17.97 38.05 8.84 19.48 15.66 996
El salvador 
2002 13.07 42.68 6.22 27.40 10.64 949
1998 2.73 33.30 1.62 50.10 12.25 988
2000 23.86 41.39 4.36 21.06 9.34 964
Guatemala 
2002 31.01 33.88 6.45 19.04 9.62 977
1998 10.74 25.24 13.21 38.02 12.78 931
2000 14.13 38.14 5.05 23.92 18.77 991
Honduras 
2002 19.70 38.17 6.09 21.02 15.03 985
1998 14.81 24.68 9.87 34.04 16.60 1175
2000 19.71 36.14 6.63 31.67 5.85 1162
México 
2002 24.71 43.12 3.32 23.88 4.98 1206
1998 9.48 37.72 6.52 32.21 14.07 981
2000 7.02 44.73 5.12 28.49 14.64 997
Nicaragua 
2002 27.02 35.18 6.55 14.72 16.53 992
1998 40.40 36.68 2.71 17.29 2.91 995
2000 27.40 48.84 1.82 14.66 7.28 989
Panamá 
2002 27.75 33.20 7.71 15.21 16.14 973
1998 7.93 28.62 15.52 39.66 8.28 580
2000 20.43 39.20 3.16 23.92 13.29 602
Paraguay 
2002 26.42 48.49 6.52 15.89 2.68 598
1998 10.22 39.68 4.86 38.39 6.85 1008
2000 13.85 43.46 4.90 32.50 5.29 1040
Perú 
2002 12.26 45.59 9.24 27.88 5.04 1191
1998 19.97 36.50 13.28 24.76 5.48 1167
2000 29.92 27.31 15.04 23.78 3.95 1190
Uruguay 
2002 34.78 37.34 12.28 11.94 3.67 1173
1998 10.81 25.51 11.57 34.46 17.65 1184
2000 11.53 23.23 10.08 32.37 22.80 1171
Venezuela 
2002 18.93 35.58 4.73 26.64 14.11 1141
1998 13.69 31.12 7.78 35.97 11.44 17405
2000 19.98 37.41 6.73 25.62 10.25 17865
Total 
2002 24.59 38.72 7.04 20.94 8.71 18059
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Table 5 – Self-assessed socio-economic status and deprivation – percent – Latin America 
1998-2000-2002 
 
Lack of Very Bad Bad 
About 
average Good 
Very 
Good 
sample 
average 
color tv set 42.29 26.37 9.75 3.13 2.52 10.44 
refrigerator/ice box/freezer 56.10 39.44 17.81 6.60 4.73 17.38 
housing 41.70 35.82 28.08 18.97 12.89 25.34 
computer 95.17 95.56 89.89 72.96 46.44 81.61 
washing machine 84.72 75.40 59.15 39.22 24.32 52.79 
telephone 78.05 70.77 49.67 24.23 13.27 42.11 
car 89.03 86.83 76.68 55.31 30.92 67.59 
second home for holiday 95.53 94.60 91.44 84.64 68.17 87.84 
drink water 26.97 16.04 8.77 5.55 4.40 9.00 
hot water 80.58 71.87 59.70 45.29 34.54 55.23 
sewage system 49.36 34.97 23.09 14.86 11.16 21.92 
How do you cover your health expenses ?  
Private insurance 7.83 10.47 16.26 30.89 47.11 22.63 
Public insurance 35.41 38.72 43.21 41.60 32.29 40.84 
No insurance 56.76 50.81 40.53 27.51 20.60 36.53 
Sample distribution:  
1998 
 
2.99 
 
11.99 
 
40.00 
 
36.24 
 
8.77 
 
100.00 
2000 3.42 14.49 41.73 32.37 7.99 100.00 
2002 4.13 16.54 38.71 32.33 8.29 100.00 
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Table 6 – Descriptive statistics of individual variables (sample weights) – Latin America 1998-
2000-2002 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
1998 17400 38.45 15.23 16 98 
2000 17865 38.33 15.58 18 99 
age 
2002 18045 38.91 16.22 16 99 
1998 17405 0.00 1.29 -2 2 
2000 17865 -0.33 1.32 -2 2 
attitude towards privatisation 
2002 18045 -0.50 1.29 -2 2 
1998 16839 9.81 4.13 0 16 
2000 17865 9.67 4.32 0 16 
years of education 
2002 18045 7.81 4.42 0 16 
1998 17405 0.51 0.50 0 1 
2000 17865 0.51 0.50 0 1 
female 
2002 18045 0.52 0.50 0 1 
1998 17405 0.51 0.50 0 1 
2000 17865 0.49 0.50 0 1 
chief income earner 
2002 18045 0.50 0.50 0 1 
1998 17137 0.35 0.91 -2 2 
2000 17860 0.26 0.93 -2 2 
socio-economic level 
2002 18045 0.18 0.97 -2 2 
 
educational attainment Freq. Percent Cum. 
Illiterate 3157 5.98 5.98 
Primary uncompleted 10409 19.73 25.72 
Primary complete 6380 12.09 37.81 
Secondary uncompleted 10382 19.68 57.49 
Secondary complete 12084 22.91 80.4 
University uncompleted 5682 10.77 91.17 
University complete 4656 8.83 100 
Total 52749 100  
 
condition Freq. Percent Cum. 
self-employed 15476 29.29 29.29 
employed public sector 4840 9.16 38.46 
employed private sector 9341 17.68 56.14 
unemployed 3611 6.83 62.97 
retired 3729 7.06 70.03 
housewife 10833 20.51 90.54 
student 5000 9.46 100 
Total 52829 100  
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Table 7 – Determinants of support for privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  ols  ols  ols 
 ordered 
probit 
 ordered 
probit 
 ordered 
probit 
age 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.01 
 [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
age squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
years of education 0.004   -0.014   
 [0.008]   [0.005]***   
years of education squared 0   0.001   
 [0.000]   [0.000]***   
selevel=Very Bad -0.152 -0.145 -0.088 -0.207 -0.2 -0.136 
 [0.076]** [0.075]* [0.066] [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** 
selevel=Bad -0.232 -0.222 -0.155 -0.269 -0.26 -0.194 
 [0.052]*** [0.051]*** [0.045]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** 
selevel=About average -0.194 -0.183 -0.141 -0.227 -0.217 -0.172 
 [0.042]*** [0.041]*** [0.037]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** 
selevel=Good -0.107 -0.1 -0.086 -0.155 -0.149 -0.125 
 [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.035]** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** 
condition=selfemployed 0.142 0.138 0.124 0.082 0.075 0.077 
 [0.035]*** [0.036]*** [0.034]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.024]*** 
condition=employed public sct 0.018 0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.027 
 [0.045] [0.047] [0.041] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] 
condition=employed private sct 0.108 0.104 0.087 0.055 0.048 0.045 
 [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]** [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.024]* 
condition=unemployed 0.07 0.067 0.065 0.031 0.025 0.034 
 [0.041]* [0.043] [0.038]* [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] 
condition=retired 0.11 0.104 0.062 0.039 0.032 0.014 
 [0.042]** [0.041]** [0.039] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] 
condition=housewife 0.158 0.156 0.144 0.095 0.09 0.094 
 [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.028]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** 
chief income earner 0.02 0.02 0.028 0.024 0.024 0.031 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]** 
status=Single 0.145 0.144 0.116 0.049 0.049 0.046 
 [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** 
status=Divorced/widow/widower 0.016 0.015 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
educ=Primary uncompleted  0.06 0.031  -0.054 -0.054 
  [0.047] [0.042]  [0.030]* [0.030]* 
educ=Primary complete  0.037 0.004  -0.074 -0.077 
  [0.057] [0.056]  [0.032]** [0.033]** 
educ=Secondary uncompleted  0.065 0.019  -0.071 -0.077 
  [0.046] [0.040]  [0.030]** [0.031]** 
educ=Secondary complete  0.112 0.058  -0.033 -0.045 
  [0.050]** [0.044]  [0.030] [0.030] 
educ=University uncompleted  0.131 0.087  -0.042 -0.038 
  [0.056]** [0.052]  [0.033] [0.034] 
educ=University complete  0.205 0.154  0.035 0.03 
  [0.061]*** [0.055]***  [0.034] [0.034] 
country situation=Very Bad   -0.249   -0.227 
   [0.034]***   [0.016]*** 
country situation=Bad   -0.182   -0.156 
   [0.021]***   [0.013]*** 
country situation=Good   0.209   0.158 
   [0.045]***   [0.021]*** 
country situation=Very Good   0.339   0.256 
   [0.117]***   [0.053]*** 
market=str.disagree   -0.725   -0.857 
   [0.055]***   [0.030]*** 
market=smwht.disagree   -0.178   -0.146 
   [0.031]***   [0.018]*** 
market=smwht.agree   0.221   0.131 
   [0.029]***   [0.016]*** 
market=str.agree   0.473   0.378 
   [0.056]***   [0.021]*** 
difficulty economic questions   -0.036   -0.041 
   [0.044]   [0.029] 
dislike economic questions   0.009   -0.003 
   [0.051]   [0.028] 
Observations 51635 51635 50242 51635 51635 50242 
R² - Pseudo R² 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Log likelihood -85913.93 -85904.67 -81809.86 -74164.89 -74155.41 -70095.25 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weighed estimates - errors clustered by country and year. 
Gender, city size, month of interview, country and year controls included 
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Table 8 – Cumulative deprivation (sample weights) – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
basic durables (housing, drinking 
water, hot water and sewage) 
electric durables (colour TV set, 
refrigerator, washing machine 
and telephone) 
luxury durables (computer, car 
and second home) 
number of 
items to be 
deprived 1998 2000 2002 1998 2000 2002 1998 2000 2002 
0 33.46 30.24 25.04 38.32 36.26 30.04 5.29 5.19 2.96 
1 40.39 39.90 36.14 28.74 30.24 24.15 12.30 12.62 10.04 
2 18.18 20.92 24.41 19.17 19.42 21.59 25.68 24.15 20.88 
3 5.98 6.80 11.55 8.25 8.70 13.10 56.73 58.04 66.12 
4 2.00 2.15 2.85 5.53 5.37 11.12     
 
Table 9 – Descriptive statistics of country features of privatization – Latin America 1990-2001 
– Source: FEEM, PrivatizationBarometer, Securities Data Corp. 
  
attitude 
(mean) 
number of 
event per 
month 
(frequency) 
duration 
(number 
of 
months) 
share of 
public 
utilities 
(shuti) 
proceedings 
over GDP 
(incidence) 
growth 
rate of 
GDP 
(last 3 
yrs) 
gini  index 
on income 
inequality 
illiteracy 
rate in 
adult 
population 
share of 
public 
expendt 
over GDP 
(pubexp) 
1990-97 -0.24 0.75 107 0.68 1.05 0.21 0.48 0.04 0.09 
1998-99 -0.69 0.60 107 0.14 1.14 -0.02 0.50 0.03 0.13 
Argentina 
2000-01 -1.14 0.00 107 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.52 0.03 0.14 
1990-97 0.15 1.00 89 0.08 2.54 0.07 0.60 0.19 0.13 
1998-99 -0.33 0.33 89 0.00 1.12 0.03 0.60 0.15 0.14 
Bolivia 
2000-01 -0.62 0.00 89 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.63 0.14 0.16 
1990-97 0.08 0.47 154 0.67 0.19 0.08 0.60 0.17 0.18 
1998-99 -0.47 0.83 154 0.27 0.88 -0.17 0.60 0.15 0.18 
Brasil 
2000-01 -0.35 0.54 154 0.10 0.83 -0.02 0.61 0.15 0.18 
1990-97 0.08 0.21 99 0.47 0.18 0.14 0.54 0.05 0.10 
1998-99 -0.37 0.54 99 0.65 1.56 -0.01 0.57 0.04 0.11 
Chile 
2000-01 -0.61 0.08 99 1.00 0.32 -0.04 0.60 0.04 0.12 
1990-97 -0.18 0.17 97 0.86 0.53 0.14 0.56 0.10 0.13 
1998-99 -0.51 0.30 97 0.99 0.77 -0.11 0.56 0.09 0.22 
Colombia 
2000-01 -0.63 0.00 97 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.57 0.08 0.19 
1990-97 0.18 0.02 1 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.56 0.11 0.10 
1998-99 -0.16 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.56 0.09 0.11 
Ecuador 
2000-01 -0.10 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 -0.28 0.56 0.08 0.09 
1990-97 0.15 1.00 8 1.00 0.04 0.12 0.52 0.25 0.09 
1998-99 -0.23 0.75 8 0.53 3.77 0.06 0.53 0.22 0.10 
El salvador 
2000-01 -0.20 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.54 0.21 0.10 
1990-97 0.36 0.25 21 1.00 0.02 0.10 0.49 0.36 0.06 
1998-99 -0.49 0.18 21 0.40 4.04 0.02 0.49 0.32 0.06 
Guatemala 
2000-01 -0.58 0.00 21 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.31 0.07 
1990-97 0.17 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.59 0.29 0.11 
1998-99 -0.05 0.04 1 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.59 0.26 0.11 
Honduras 
2000-01 -0.26 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.58 0.25 0.13 
1990-97 0.13 0.47 159 0.00 0.41 0.09 0.53 0.11 0.10 
1998-99 -0.32 0.42 159 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.55 0.09 0.11 
México 
2000-01 -0.59 0.17 159 0.00 0.17 0.14 0.54 0.09 0.11 
1990-97 -0.94 0.07 97 0.00 0.91 0.07 0.56 0.10 0.15 
1998-99 -0.74 0.21 97 0.95 1.43 0.15 0.58 0.09 0.14 
Panamá 
2000-01 -0.41 0.00 97 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.58 0.08 0.15 
1990-97 0.12 0.05 38 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.53 0.09 0.07 
1998-99 -0.30 0.00 38 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.58 0.07 0.09 
Paraguay 
2000-01 -0.80 0.00 38 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.58 0.07 0.10 
1990-97 -0.08 0.95 119 0.29 1.10 0.16 0.43 0.13 0.09 
1998-99 -0.28 0.13 119 0.00 0.08 -0.07 0.51 0.11 0.11 
Perú 
2000-01 -0.32 0.13 119 0.73 0.29 0.03 0.49 0.10 0.11 
1990-97 -0.41 0.04 88 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.43 0.03 0.12 
1998-99 -0.55 0.00 88 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.44 0.02 0.13 
Uruguay 
2000-01 -0.88 0.04 88 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.44 0.02 0.13 
1990-97 0.23 0.43 98 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.49 0.10 0.08 
1998-99 0.32 0.63 98 0.04 1.13 0.08 0.48 0.08 0.08 
Venezuela 
2000-01 -0.19 0.00 98 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.46 0.07 0.07 
1990-97 0.00 0.39 80.66 0.34 0.50 0.11 0.53 0.14 0.11 
1998-99 -0.31 0.34 80.67 0.27 1.06 0.00 0.54 0.12 0.12 
Total 
2000-01 -0.50 0.06 81.28 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.55 0.11 0.12 
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Table 10 – Descriptive statistics of country features of privatization – Latin America 1984-
2002 – Source: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, The World Bank Group 
  attitude (mean) 
divestiture 
/total 
(funds) 
divestiture 
/total 
(cases) 
distressed 
/total 
(funds) 
distressed 
/total 
(cases) 
investment 
gov.asset/ 
total funds 
water & 
sewerage 
/utilities 
(funds) 
water & 
sewerage 
/utilities 
(cases) 
electricity 
/utilities 
(funds) 
electricity 
/utilities 
(cases) 
1984-1998 -0.24 0.52 0.42 0.43 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.35 0.57 
1999-2000 -0.69 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.20 0.12 0.48 0.27 0.41 0.27 
Argentina 
2001-2002 -1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.15 0.28 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.69 0.56 
1999-2000 -0.33 0.02 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.04 0.48 0.14 0.27 0.57 
Bolivia 
2001-2002 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.33 
1984-1998 0.08 0.72 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.43 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.27 
1999-2000 -0.47 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.56 0.47 
Brasil 
2001-2002 -0.35 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.48 0.72 
1984-1998 0.08 0.43 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.43 0.48 
1999-2000 -0.37 0.72 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.72 0.36 0.18 0.14 
Chile 
2001-2002 -0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 -0.18 0.38 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.10 0.59 0.46 
1999-2000 -0.51 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.19 0.30 
Colombia 
2001-2002 -0.63 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.93 0.88 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.20 
1999-2000 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador 
2001-2002 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.15 0.86 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.50 
1999-2000 -0.23 0.73 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
El salvador 
2001-2002 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.36 0.70 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.76 
1999-2000 -0.49 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.60 
Guatemala 
2001-2002 -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
1984-1998 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.75 
1999-2000 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Honduras 
2001-2002 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.13 0.52 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.20 
1999-2000 -0.32 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.62 0.50 
México 
2001-2002 -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.35 0.71 
1984-1998 -0.94 0.52 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.31 
1999-2000 -0.74 0.86 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Panamá 
2001-2002 -0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1999-2000 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Paraguay 
2001-2002 -0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 -0.08 0.84 0.60 0.05 0.20 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.76 
1999-2000 -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 
Perú 
2001-2002 -0.32 0.75 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.14 0.56 0.43 
1984-1998 -0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.27 0.17 
1999-2000 -0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.52 0.33 0.48 0.67 
Uruguay 
2001-2002 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.23 0.76 0.27 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.18 
1999-2000 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Venezuela 
2001-2002 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.50 0.00 0.00 
1984-1998 0.00 0.45 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.02 0.06 0.32 0.41 
1999-2000 -0.31 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.35 0.38 
Total 
2001-2002 -0.50 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.21 
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Table 11 – Determinants of support for privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 – 
Privatisation features from FEEM, PrivatizationBarometer, Securities Data Corp. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
without 
features 
country 
features 
privatisation 
features 
entire 
sample 1998 2000 2002 
educ=Primary uncompleted -0.046 -0.044 -0.044 -0.033 -0.033 -0.037 -0.075 
 [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.025] [0.064] [0.046] [0.057] 
educ=Primary complete -0.086 -0.059 -0.059 -0.037 -0.02 -0.132 -0.13 
 [0.053] [0.055] [0.057] [0.028] [0.066] [0.063]** [0.059]** 
educ=Secondary uncompleted -0.092 -0.078 -0.074 -0.07 -0.032 -0.097 -0.181 
 [0.044]** [0.044]* [0.045]* [0.027]*** [0.064] [0.049]* [0.059]***
educ=Secondary complete -0.04 -0.04 -0.037 -0.033 -0.036 -0.025 -0.127 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.027] [0.065] [0.048] [0.059]** 
educ=University uncompleted -0.027 -0.033 -0.019 -0.014 -0.018 0.054 -0.144 
 [0.059] [0.055] [0.055] [0.031] [0.068] [0.056] [0.069]** 
educ=University complete 0.038 0.032 0.042 0.033 -0.004 0.16 -0.133 
 [0.061] [0.056] [0.059] [0.031] [0.069] [0.058]*** [0.071]* 
socio-economic level=Very Bad -0.161 -0.169 -0.155 -0.131 -0.01 -0.106 -0.131 
 [0.054]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.035]*** [0.069] [0.067] [0.067]* 
socio-economic level=Bad -0.229 -0.238 -0.224 -0.201 -0.083 -0.142 -0.247 
 [0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.025]*** [0.046]* [0.049]*** [0.049]***
socio-economic level=About average -0.192 -0.201 -0.188 -0.158 -0.124 -0.093 -0.18 
 [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.022]*** [0.039]*** [0.044]** [0.043]***
socio-economic level=Good -0.142 -0.144 -0.134 -0.115 -0.112 -0.062 -0.129 
 [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.021]*** [0.038]*** [0.044] [0.042]***
GDP per capita growth rate  0.131  -0.025 3.722 -0.262 1.048 
  [0.287]  [0.103] [1.276]*** [0.177] [0.248]***
income inequality (gini)  0.136  0.607 0.865 1.233 -0.163 
  [1.559]  [0.576] [0.358]** [0.429]*** [0.495] 
illitteracy rate  1.36  -1.003 2.527 0.133 -0.7 
  [1.476]  [1.226] [0.483]*** [0.285] [0.389]* 
public expenditure/gdp  -4.522  -3.055 -9.944 -1.481 -0.754 
  [1.311]***  [0.524]*** [0.646]*** [0.550]*** [0.691] 
frequency of privatisation   0.033 -0.031 0.13 0.277 0.368 
   [0.123] [0.040] [0.062]** [0.070]*** [1.226] 
duration   0.011 0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
   [0.002]*** [0.004]* [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
share of public utility (shuti)   0.084 2.188 -6.391 1.187 1.768 
   [0.086] [0.290]*** [0.769]*** [1.709] [0.571]***
incidence   -0.03 -0.03 -0.086 -0.093 0.463 
   [0.029] [0.010]*** [0.039]** [0.029]*** [0.807] 
ending date   -0.148 -0.116 -0.017 0.015 -0.072 
   [0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.010]* [0.011] [0.020]***
shuti×gini    -3.409 12.174 -1.866 -2.685 
    [0.527]*** [1.371]*** [2.978] [1.150]** 
shuti×deprivation of basic    0.037 0.009 -0.015 0.106 
    [0.016]** [0.025] [0.031] [0.040]***
shuti×deprivation of electric durables    -0.016 -0.033 -0.052 0.032 
    [0.014] [0.022] [0.026]** [0.035] 
shuti×deprivation of luxury goods    -0.118 -0.146 -0.077 -0.087 
    [0.015]*** [0.023]*** [0.031]** [0.037]** 
Observations 44808 44808 44808 42931 13202 14882 14847 
Pseudo R² 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Log likelihood -62454.4 -62334.3 -62338.6 -59694.7 -18416.2 -20349 -20677.2 
Ordered probit weighed estimates - errors clustered by country and year.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Gender, age, marital status, employment status, city size, perceived country situation,  
attitude towards market, month of interview, country and year controls included. 
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Table 12 – Determinants of support for privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 - 
Privatisation features from Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, The World Bank Group 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 without features 
country 
features 
privatisation
features 
privatisation
features 1998 2000 2002 
educ=Primary uncompleted -0.046 -0.044 -0.049 -0.049 -0.034 -0.063 -0.06 
 [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045] [0.064] [0.046] [0.057] 
educ=Primary complete -0.086 -0.059 -0.078 -0.057 0.008 -0.079 -0.11 
 [0.053] [0.055] [0.054] [0.057] [0.066] [0.063] [0.060]* 
educ=Secondary uncompleted -0.092 -0.078 -0.091 -0.084 0.002 -0.11 -0.183 
 [0.044]** [0.044]* [0.045]** [0.045]* [0.064] [0.049]** [0.059]***
educ=Secondary complete -0.04 -0.04 -0.037 -0.042 0.025 -0.023 -0.149 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.065] [0.048] [0.059]** 
educ=University uncompleted -0.027 -0.033 -0.023 -0.032 0.029 0.06 -0.174 
 [0.059] [0.055] [0.059] [0.056] [0.068] [0.057] [0.069]** 
educ=University complete 0.038 0.032 0.045 0.031 0.069 0.176 -0.163 
 [0.061] [0.056] [0.058] [0.058] [0.069] [0.058]*** [0.071]** 
socio-economic level=Very Bad -0.161 -0.169 -0.158 -0.129 -0.125 -0.155 -0.091 
 [0.054]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.058]** [0.067]* [0.066]** [0.067] 
socio-economic level=Bad -0.229 -0.238 -0.22 -0.198 -0.161 -0.178 -0.217 
 [0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.046]*** [0.049]*** [0.050]***
socio-economic level=About average -0.192 -0.201 -0.184 -0.172 -0.197 -0.135 -0.163 
 [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.039]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]***
socio-economic level=Good -0.142 -0.144 -0.134 -0.131 -0.172 -0.089 -0.112 
 [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.034]*** [0.037]*** [0.043]** [0.041]***
GDP per capita growth rate  0.131  -0.033 11.184 -0.512 0.204 
  [0.287]  [0.227] [0.939]*** [0.284]* [0.273] 
income inequality (gini)  0.136  1.041 0.269 -0.84 0.559 
  [1.559]  [1.594] [0.451] [1.452] [0.500] 
illitteracy rate  1.36  0.876 2.227 0.711 2.751 
  [1.476]  [1.292] [0.330]*** [0.233]*** [0.298]***
public expenditure/gdp  -4.522  -4.024 0.588 -2.176 2.542 
  [1.311]***  [0.906]*** [0.661] [0.537]*** [0.844]***
divestiture/total (funds)   0.311 0.27 -0.345 -0.359 0.519 
   [0.116]*** [0.114]** [0.101]*** [0.094]*** [0.124]***
distressed/total (funds)   0.246 0.357 -0.153 -1.35 -6.216 
   [0.164] [0.137]*** [0.274] [0.272]*** [2.111]***
water and sewerage/utilities (funds)   0.016 1.222 -66.525 -4.447 20.768 
   [0.069] [0.582]** [8.668]*** [1.676]*** [3.348]***
electricity/utilities (funds)   -0.16 -0.1 -0.447 0.606 -0.423 
   [0.071]** [0.074] [0.088]*** [0.202]*** [0.074]***
investment in gov.asset/total (funds)   -0.518 -0.472 -1.157 -1.69 -0.115 
   [0.259]** [0.179]*** [0.150]*** [0.620]*** [0.337] 
(water/utilities)×income inequality    -2.119 121.097 9.493 -36.088 
    [1.062]** [15.432]*** [3.270]*** [5.801]***
(water/utilities)×deprivation of basic     -0.064 0.747 -0.085 -0.07 
    [0.031]** [0.327]** [0.029]*** [0.034]** 
(electricity/utilities)×deprivation of 
electric durables    -0.054 -0.087 -0.005 -0.034 
    [0.021]** [0.024]*** [0.018] [0.024] 
Observations 44808 44808 44808 43474 13404 15070 15000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Log likelihood -62454.4 -62334.3 -62361 -60421.8 -18664.4 -20612.7 -20850 
Ordered probit weighed estimates - errors clustered by country and year.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Gender, age, marital status, employment status, city size, perceived country situation,  
attitude towards market, month of interview, country and year controls included. 
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Appendix – Additional tables 
Table A.1 – Latinobarometro - Probability of non responding 
  
 entire sample 1998 2000 2002 
female 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.007 
 [0.002]** [0.003] [0.001]* [0.003]** 
age 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
age squared 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
chief income earner 0 -0.001 0 0.001 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
status=Single 0 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]** [0.001] 
status=Divorced/widow/widower 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] 
educ=Primary uncompleted -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008 
 [0.002]** [0.005] [0.002] [0.003]** 
educ=Primary complete -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
 [0.003]** [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] 
educ=Secondary uncompleted -0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.01 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]* [0.002]** [0.003]*** 
educ=Secondary complete -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 -0.013 
 [0.002]*** [0.004]* [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
educ=University uncompleted -0.01 -0.012 -0.003 -0.01 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]** [0.004]*** 
educ=University complete -0.011 -0.012 -0.002 -0.015 
 [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.002]*** 
condition=selfemployed -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 
 [0.002] [0.003]* [0.001] [0.004]* 
condition=employed public sct -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 -0.01 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.001] [0.003]*** 
condition=employed private sct -0.004 -0.005 0 -0.009 
 [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.001] [0.004]** 
condition=unemployed -0.005 -0.006 0.002 -0.01 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]** 
condition=retired -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.006 
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] 
condition=housewife -0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 
 [0.002] [0.003]* [0.003] [0.004] 
selevel=Very Bad 0.024 0.025 0.008 0.035 
 [0.008]*** [0.020] [0.007] [0.010]*** 
selevel=Bad 0.01 0.018 0.005 0.009 
 [0.003]*** [0.006]*** [0.002]** [0.007] 
selevel=About average 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.001 
 [0.002]* [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
selevel=Good 0 -0.003 0.002 0 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] 
dislike economic questions -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.001]*** [0.008] 
difficulty economic questions 0.007 0.02 0.006 -0.002 
 [0.005] [0.011]* [0.002]** [0.005] 
month=may 0 -0.014 -0.004 0.002 
 [0.003] [0.004]*** [0.002] [0.003] 
living in metropolitan areas 0.005 0.01 -0.004 0.004 
 [0.005] [0.011] [0.002]* [0.006] 
country=argentina -0.012 0.04 -0.007 -0.02 
 [0.001]*** [0.008]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
country=bolivia -0.007 0.109 -0.006 -0.016 
 [0.001]*** [0.020]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
country=brasil -0.006 0 -0.005 -0.011 
 [0.001]*** [0.005] [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
country=colombia 0.001 0.062 -0.007 0 
 [0.002] [0.013]*** [0.000]*** [0.002] 
country=costa rica 0.001 0.045 -0.002 -0.01 
 [0.001] [0.008]*** [0.002] [0.001]*** 
country=chile -0.014 0.001 -0.006 -0.017 
 [0.001]*** [0.005] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
country=ecuador 0 0.075 -0.004 -0.01 
 [0.002] [0.015]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
country=el salvador 0 0.005 -0.006 0.003 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.000]*** [0.006] 
country=guatemala -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.011 
 [0.001]*** [0.003] [0.002]* [0.001]*** 
country=honduras -0.001 0.075 -0.006 -0.013 
 [0.001] [0.011]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
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country=méxico -0.012 0.01 -0.006 -0.02 
 [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
country=nicaragua -0.008 0.015 -0.006 -0.013 
 [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
country=panamá -0.008 -0.01 -0.006 -0.009 
 [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
country=paraguay -0.009   -0.019 
 [0.001]***   [0.001]*** 
country=perú -0.003 0.062 -0.005 -0.009 
 [0.001]*** [0.016]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
country=uruguay -0.006 0.05 -0.006 -0.011 
 [0.001]*** [0.012]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Observations 52634 16397 17278 18357 
Pseudo R² 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.1 
Log likelihood -4830.71 -1681.7 -846.9 -2093.04 
Maximum likelihood probit model (weighed) with clustered standard errors (by country)  
marginal effects – * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.2 - Latinobarometro - Self-assessed socio-economic level - Percent distribution 
 
Country  Very Bad Bad About average Good Very Good 
1998 0.85 7.51 36.31 45.16 10.17 
2000 1.04 9.41 42.41 39.43 7.71 
Argentina 
2002 1.07 7.87 35.15 42.57 13.35 
1998 0.56 11.87 45.54 34.57 7.47 
2000 0.37 18.40 52.42 27.14 1.67 
Bolivia 
2002 3.43 29.91 50.24 15.17 1.25 
1998 1.51 9.41 42.25 36.80 10.03 
2000 0.63 10.41 39.81 37.58 11.58 
Brasil 
2002 1.95 12.50 38.42 40.47 6.66 
1998 1.73 12.13 49.43 29.47 7.23 
2000 3.35 19.36 51.62 23.09 2.58 
Chile 
2002 4.18 20.81 45.16 26.30 3.54 
1998 0.77 6.58 35.98 46.41 10.26 
2000 2.15 10.52 25.69 40.67 20.97 
Colombia 
2002 3.80 11.87 30.55 42.11 11.67 
1998 0.62 3.30 29.62 56.97 9.49 
2000 1.05 4.63 37.64 39.22 17.46 
Costarica 
2002 2.15 8.99 33.30 45.97 9.60 
1998 2.95 13.89 40.80 37.15 5.21 
2000 1.35 11.76 38.58 44.25 4.06 
Ecuador 
2002 0.73 20.81 49.20 24.21 5.04 
1998 1.82 5.76 30.10 42.93 19.39 
2000 11.35 22.09 36.85 21.59 8.13 
El salvador 
2002 9.90 23.94 29.47 28.33 8.35 
1998 15.89 35.53 24.09 15.99 8.50 
2000 12.86 24.38 36.62 14.83 11.31 
Guatemala 
2002 3.24 13.96 40.86 33.74 8.20 
1998 2.04 13.43 32.01 41.14 11.39 
2000 11.30 25.13 33.20 20.28 10.09 
Honduras 
2002 4.35 16.78 35.60 30.84 12.43 
1998 2.98 19.57 50.47 23.74 3.23 
2000 6.54 27.71 50.17 14.03 1.55 
México 
2002 13.74 22.98 22.38 23.81 17.08 
1998 2.24 11.72 47.91 27.62 10.50 
2000 2.21 15.45 43.13 33.70 5.52 
Nicaragua 
2002 12.20 25.81 32.16 21.17 8.67 
1998 0.45 8.94 43.02 41.34 6.26 
2000 0.61 6.37 41.46 40.44 11.12 
Panamá 
2002 4.11 16.65 39.67 30.11 9.46 
1998 2.52 10.12 36.10 38.59 12.65 
2000 1.32 12.28 38.33 38.39 9.67 
Paraguay 
2002 6.36 18.76 41.34 28.15 5.39 
1998 5.16 17.36 48.12 24.11 5.26 
2000 1.63 20.38 50.58 25.38 2.02 
Perú 
2002 3.99 27.49 50.62 16.18 1.72 
1998 2.68 8.96 42.09 41.78 4.49 
2000 2.49 8.85 42.05 42.92 3.69 
Uruguay 
2002 2.19 13.94 47.77 33.17 2.92 
1998 5.49 8.02 47.04 31.42 8.02 
2000 0.26 6.15 52.09 33.05 8.45 
Venezuela 
2002 2.26 13.73 46.29 32.37 5.34 
1998 3.00 11.99 40.28 36.13 8.61 
2000 3.50 14.87 42.15 31.56 7.92 
Total 
2002 4.59 18.16 39.53 30.07 7.66 
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Table A.3 – Determinants of the socio-economic self-assessment. 
Weighed OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 entire sample 1998 2000 2002 entire sample 1998 2000 2002 
Has color TV -0.288 -0.29 -0.328 -0.274 -0.248 -0.257 -0.288 -0.231 
 [0.027]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.047]*** [0.026]*** [0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.044]***
Has freezer -0.225 -0.212 -0.274 -0.228 -0.193 -0.172 -0.245 -0.198 
 [0.025]*** [0.047]*** [0.039]*** [0.044]*** [0.024]*** [0.045]*** [0.036]*** [0.042]***
Has house of your own -0.088 -0.095 -0.077 -0.051 -0.088 -0.089 -0.076 -0.059 
 [0.017]*** [0.023]*** [0.035]** [0.025]* [0.017]*** [0.023]*** [0.034]** [0.026]** 
Has computer -0.28 -0.244 -0.252 -0.369 -0.218 -0.181 -0.185 -0.311 
 [0.040]*** [0.034]*** [0.029]*** [0.116]*** [0.046]*** [0.033]*** [0.028]*** [0.133]** 
Has washing machine -0.176 -0.177 -0.168 -0.232 -0.154 -0.155 -0.147 -0.205 
 [0.022]*** [0.026]*** [0.041]*** [0.042]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]*** [0.038]*** [0.041]***
Has telephone -0.251 -0.279 -0.261 -0.242 -0.213 -0.245 -0.219 -0.203 
 [0.019]*** [0.031]*** [0.022]*** [0.028]*** [0.017]*** [0.031]*** [0.019]*** [0.024]***
Has car -0.222 -0.219 -0.201 -0.263 -0.199 -0.201 -0.176 -0.241 
 [0.015]*** [0.030]*** [0.026]*** [0.023]*** [0.017]*** [0.031]*** [0.024]*** [0.030]***
Has a second house or holiday home -0.129 -0.177 -0.097 -0.076 -0.114 -0.164 -0.08 -0.063 
 [0.021]*** [0.029]*** [0.027]*** [0.046] [0.021]*** [0.030]*** [0.027]*** [0.042] 
Has drinking water -0.105 -0.109 -0.123 -0.116 -0.087 -0.098 -0.105 -0.091 
 [0.029]*** [0.037]*** [0.055]** [0.051]** [0.030]*** [0.040]** [0.056]* [0.049]* 
Has hot water -0.116 -0.154 -0.113 -0.107 -0.098 -0.144 -0.092 -0.084 
 [0.025]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.059]* [0.024]*** [0.033]*** [0.030]*** [0.054] 
Has sewage system -0.127 -0.103 -0.082 -0.199 -0.102 -0.075 -0.06 -0.176 
 [0.027]*** [0.040]** [0.021]*** [0.055]*** [0.029]*** [0.038]* [0.025]** [0.057]***
Public Insurance -0.177 -0.162 -0.178 -0.183 -0.164 -0.153 -0.163 -0.16 
 [0.018]*** [0.026]*** [0.033]*** [0.031]*** [0.015]*** [0.021]*** [0.028]*** [0.022]***
Don´t have Insurance -0.283 -0.184 -0.284 -0.25 -0.251 -0.154 -0.242 -0.201 
 [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.040]*** [0.048]*** [0.033]*** [0.031]*** [0.035]*** [0.045]***
female     0.035 0.023 0.044 0.034 
     [0.008]*** [0.018] [0.014]*** [0.013]** 
age     0.007 0.003 0.006 0.009 
     [0.002]*** [0.003] [0.002]** [0.003]***
age squared     0 0 0 0 
     [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]** 
chief income earner     -0.045 -0.035 -0.044 -0.044 
     [0.011]*** [0.015]** [0.023]* [0.018]** 
educ=Primary uncompleted     0.14 0.09 0.113 0.157 
     [0.036]*** [0.048]* [0.038]*** [0.068]** 
educ=Primary complete     0.211 0.163 0.168 0.253 
     [0.036]*** [0.045]*** [0.042]*** [0.067]***
educ=Secondary uncompleted     0.275 0.197 0.264 0.329 
     [0.046]*** [0.050]*** [0.039]*** [0.091]***
educ=Secondary complete     0.378 0.324 0.372 0.403 
     [0.057]*** [0.050]*** [0.048]*** [0.122]***
educ=University uncompleted     0.455 0.425 0.427 0.468 
     [0.059]*** [0.063]*** [0.050]*** [0.118]***
educ=University complete     0.559 0.489 0.577 0.617 
     [0.060]*** [0.049]*** [0.066]*** [0.123]***
condition=selfemployed     -0.069 -0.065 -0.071 -0.115 
     [0.025]*** [0.045] [0.047] [0.028]***
condition=employed public sct     -0.08 -0.074 -0.1 -0.077 
     [0.022]*** [0.032]** [0.045]** [0.033]** 
condition=employed private sct     -0.108 -0.126 -0.102 -0.111 
     [0.023]*** [0.037]*** [0.050]* [0.023]***
condition=unemployed     -0.15 -0.19 -0.154 -0.166 
     [0.032]*** [0.034]*** [0.061]** [0.036]***
condition=retired     -0.009 0.011 -0.03 -0.043 
     [0.031] [0.046] [0.055] [0.047] 
condition=housewife     -0.112 -0.099 -0.118 -0.136 
     [0.022]*** [0.032]*** [0.037]*** [0.033]***
Observations 50190 15903 16812 17475 49379 15092 16812 17475 
R² 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.35 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weighed estimates - errors clustered by country 
country and year controls included 
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Table A.4– Descriptive statistics (mean and percentage) by country – Latin America 1998-2000-
2002 
 
Country   attitude 
towards 
privatisation 
female age 
chief 
income 
earner 
years of 
education 
socio-
economic 
level 
1998 -0.22 0.52 42.53 0.50 10.08 0.56 
2000 -0.72 0.52 42.67 0.51 9.62 0.43 
Argentina 
2002 -1.15 0.52 42.37 0.47 10.08 0.59 
1998 0.10 0.57 38.06 0.53 7.93 0.37 
2000 -0.33 0.51 34.17 0.46 10.86 0.11 
Bolivia 
2002 -0.59 0.52 41.56 0.57 6.92 -0.19 
1998 0.12 0.53 38.02 0.42 8.10 0.44 
2000 -0.50 0.53 38.52 0.47 8.32 0.49 
Brasil 
2002 -0.35 0.51 37.15 0.46 6.09 0.37 
1998 0.10 0.54 39.36 0.39 10.75 0.28 
2000 -0.42 0.52 40.01 0.44 9.13 0.02 
Chile 
2002 -0.65 0.52 40.57 0.46 9.39 0.04 
1998 -0.18 0.50 37.65 0.53 9.77 0.59 
2000 -0.54 0.52 38.30 0.51 10.39 0.68 
Colombia 
2002 -0.65 0.53 35.85 0.47 6.98 0.46 
1998 0.37 0.50 41.49 0.60 9.89 0.71 
2000 -0.08 0.50 38.86 0.54 8.98 0.67 
Costarica 
2002 -0.28 0.51 37.27 0.44 7.69 0.52 
1998 0.18 0.49 36.38 0.47 9.67 0.28 
2000 -0.16 0.50 36.59 0.47 9.84 0.38 
Ecuador 
2002 -0.18 0.54 41.42 0.55 7.61 0.12 
1998 0.15 0.51 34.25 0.70 10.85 0.72 
2000 -0.23 0.51 36.57 0.46 8.78 -0.07 
El salvador 
2002 -0.19 0.52 38.69 0.55 6.74 0.01 
1998 0.36 0.49 33.35 0.47 10.75 -0.34 
2000 -0.49 0.49 36.59 0.46 10.18 -0.13 
Guatemala 
2002 -0.59 0.52 37.11 0.45 7.65 0.30 
1998 0.17 0.52 37.64 0.53 9.73 0.46 
2000 -0.05 0.51 37.32 0.48 9.61 -0.07 
Honduras 
2002 -0.31 0.51 37.65 0.54 5.79 0.30 
1998 0.13 0.49 36.51 0.45 9.18 0.05 
2000 -0.32 0.51 37.07 0.48 8.59 -0.24 
México 
2002 -0.62 0.51 36.33 0.59 7.75 0.08 
1998 0.04 0.51 36.42 0.61 11.32 0.32 
2000 -0.01 0.51 35.11 0.54 9.94 0.25 
Nicaragua 
2002 -0.41 0.50 34.57 0.43 6.93 -0.12 
1998 -0.94 0.54 38.71 0.56 11.07 0.44 
2000 -0.74 0.49 39.34 0.58 11.34 0.55 
Panamá 
2002 -0.41 0.49 38.28 0.54 8.26 0.24 
1998 0.10 0.53 40.84 0.46 8.27 0.49 
2000 -0.32 0.52 41.31 0.47 9.75 0.43 
Paraguay 
2002 -0.78 0.52 35.70 0.40 8.07 0.07 
1998 -0.08 0.50 35.87 0.41 11.94 0.07 
2000 -0.28 0.50 35.24 0.43 12.25 0.06 
Perú 
2002 -0.31 0.50 38.86 0.50 9.84 -0.16 
1998 -0.40 0.51 48.41 0.62 7.82 0.36 
2000 -0.59 0.51 46.58 0.58 7.89 0.36 
Uruguay 
2002 -0.81 0.56 44.96 0.52 8.01 0.21 
1998 0.23 0.49 37.19 0.47 8.95 0.28 
2000 0.32 0.50 37.04 0.49 9.26 0.43 
Venezuela 
2002 -0.18 0.50 39.63 0.53 8.16 0.25 
1998 0.00 0.51 38.45 0.51 9.81 0.35 
2000 -0.33 0.51 38.33 0.49 9.67 0.26 
Total 
2002 -0.50 0.52 38.91 0.50 7.81 0.18 
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Table A.5 – Determinants of support for privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002  
 
 
1998 - ols 2000 - ols 2002 - ols 
1998 - 
ordered 
probit 
2000 - 
ordered 
probit 
2002 - 
ordered 
probit 
educ=Primary uncompleted 0.043 0.058 -0.071 -0.04 0.02 -0.091 
 [0.056] [0.048] [0.076] [0.060] [0.043] [0.050]* 
educ=Primary complete 0.05 0.032 -0.128 -0.02 0.001 -0.148 
 [0.074] [0.043] [0.089] [0.061] [0.060] [0.052]*** 
educ=Secondary uncompleted 0.026 0.002 -0.143 -0.051 -0.024 -0.172 
 [0.052] [0.044] [0.072]* [0.060] [0.046] [0.052]*** 
educ=Secondary complete 0.047 0.095 -0.153 -0.036 0.054 -0.177 
 [0.059] [0.035]** [0.080]* [0.060] [0.045] [0.053]*** 
educ=University uncompleted 0.089 0.176 -0.188 -0.007 0.125 -0.227 
 [0.081] [0.058]*** [0.092]* [0.063] [0.051]** [0.061]*** 
educ=University complete 0.11 0.299 -0.151 0.014 0.232 -0.191 
 [0.074] [0.053]*** [0.082]* [0.063] [0.054]*** [0.063]*** 
selevel=Very Bad -0.089 -0.152 0.013 -0.105 -0.142 -0.042 
 [0.062] [0.088] [0.114] [0.062]* [0.062]** [0.061] 
selevel=Bad -0.085 -0.196 -0.112 -0.112 -0.167 -0.16 
 [0.052] [0.047]*** [0.069] [0.043]*** [0.044]*** [0.045]*** 
selevel=About average -0.105 -0.143 -0.093 -0.122 -0.125 -0.123 
 [0.048]** [0.056]** [0.049]* [0.035]*** [0.039]*** [0.038]*** 
selevel=Good -0.096 -0.075 -0.06 -0.107 -0.074 -0.101 
 [0.047]* [0.059] [0.041] [0.034]*** [0.039]* [0.038]*** 
condition=selfemployed 0.116 0.1 0.096 0.091 0.081 0.06 
 [0.035]*** [0.049]* [0.056] [0.041]** [0.040]** [0.047] 
condition=employed public sct -0.017 0.012 0.039 -0.027 0.01 0.011 
 [0.067] [0.062] [0.071] [0.047] [0.045] [0.055] 
condition=employed private sct 0.09 0.072 0.03 0.075 0.054 -0.006 
 [0.050]* [0.049] [0.048] [0.040]* [0.039] [0.047] 
condition=unemployed -0.007 0.069 0.042 -0.018 0.055 0.011 
 [0.051] [0.063] [0.059] [0.053] [0.047] [0.050] 
condition=retired -0.015 0.049 0.095 -0.04 0.041 0.055 
 [0.046] [0.051] [0.075] [0.056] [0.054] [0.063] 
condition=housewife 0.076 0.132 0.15 0.061 0.112 0.107 
 [0.040]* [0.039]*** [0.043]*** [0.043] [0.041]*** [0.049]** 
status=Single 0.073 0.04 0.155 0.038 0.019 0.107 
 [0.026]** [0.019]* [0.031]*** [0.025] [0.024] [0.027]*** 
countsit=Very Bad -0.203 -0.256 -0.21 -0.208 -0.244 -0.21 
 [0.045]*** [0.082]*** [0.033]*** [0.027]*** [0.029]*** [0.031]*** 
countsit=Bad -0.147 -0.184 -0.153 -0.144 -0.16 -0.142 
 [0.026]*** [0.038]*** [0.029]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.024]*** 
countsit=Good 0.157 0.181 0.107 0.142 0.143 0.077 
 [0.057]** [0.084]** [0.056]* [0.036]*** [0.034]*** [0.043]* 
countsit=Very Good 0.147 0.337 0.15 0.119 0.277 0.103 
 [0.158] [0.167]* [0.191] [0.084] [0.081]*** [0.118] 
market=str.disagree -0.402 -0.831 -0.297 -0.5 -0.977 -0.446 
 [0.081]*** [0.085]*** [0.051]*** [0.063]*** [0.047]*** [0.056]*** 
market=smwht.disagree -0.105 -0.251 -0.093 -0.073 -0.162 -0.094 
 [0.042]** [0.039]*** [0.059] [0.036]** [0.026]*** [0.038]** 
market=smwht.agree 0.2 0.226 0.099 0.158 0.147 0.063 
 [0.047]*** [0.035]*** [0.059] [0.031]*** [0.025]*** [0.033]* 
market=str.agree 0.367 0.548 0.229 0.388 0.479 0.188 
 [0.062]*** [0.093]*** [0.094]** [0.038]*** [0.035]*** [0.044]*** 
state=str.disagree -0.77  -0.944 -0.848  -1.189 
 [0.088]***  [0.064]*** [0.050]***  [0.049]*** 
state=smwht.disagree -0.275  -0.266 -0.225  -0.233 
 [0.052]***  [0.041]*** [0.035]***  [0.036]*** 
state=smwht.agree 0.37  0.241 0.296  0.133 
 [0.060]***  [0.051]*** [0.036]***  [0.037]*** 
state=str.agree 0.784  0.598 0.804  0.449 
 [0.064]***  [0.103]*** [0.047]***  [0.055]*** 
happyness=quite happy  0.119 -0.008  0.102 -0.053 
  [0.037]*** [0.072]  [0.023]*** [0.054] 
happyness=not very happy  0.154 0.049  0.131 -0.014 
  [0.036]*** [0.072]  [0.028]*** [0.053] 
happyness=not at all happy  0.216 0.113  0.187 0.058 
  [0.054]*** [0.081]  [0.030]*** [0.055] 
Observations 15455 17302 16993 15455 17302 16993 
R² / Pseudo R² 0.24 0.2 0.31 0.1 0.06 0.1 
Log likelihood -23761 -27935.9 -26481.6 -20202.9 -23543.8 -22325.2 
Robust standard errors in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% - Weighed estimates - errors clustered by 
country. – Age, age squared, gender, chief income earner, widowed/divorced, city size, month of interview, dislike and difficulties to understand, 
country controls included.         
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Table A.6 – Effects of socio-economic condition on support to privatization by country – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
 
 Argentina Bolivia Brasil Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
selevel=Very Bad 0.351 0.106 0.108 -0.147 0.023 0.012 -0.24 -0.233 -0.174 -0.315 -0.261 -0.03 -0.18 -0.031 -0.6 -0.369 0.106 
 [0.224] [0.271] [0.216] [0.171] [0.178] [0.214] [0.173] [0.114]** [0.098]* [0.118]*** [0.117]** [0.135] [0.198] [0.178] [0.156]*** [0.196]* [0.271] 
selevel=Bad 0.092 -0.283 -0.219 -0.244 0.201 -0.2 -0.404 -0.34 -0.248 -0.217 -0.294 -0.078 -0.251 -0.153 -0.565 -0.198 -0.283 
 [0.097] [0.145]* [0.109]** [0.102]** [0.098]** [0.109]* [0.104]*** [0.095]*** [0.087]*** [0.090]** [0.100]*** [0.093] [0.109]** [0.143] [0.116]*** [0.134] [0.145]* 
selevel=About average 0.162 -0.1 -0.218 -0.279 -0.064 -0.251 -0.143 -0.391 -0.338 -0.283 -0.168 -0.139 -0.191 -0.115 -0.564 -0.314 -0.1 
 [0.073]** [0.135] [0.089]** [0.082]*** [0.076] [0.089]*** [0.083]* [0.081]*** [0.086]*** [0.079]*** [0.096]* [0.079]* [0.081]** [0.109] [0.109]*** [0.113]*** [0.135] 
selevel=Good 0.098 0.035 -0.188 -0.164 -0.023 -0.164 -0.064 -0.366 -0.211 -0.14 -0.1 -0.231 -0.205 -0.03 -0.374 -0.35 0.035 
 [0.071] [0.138] [0.085]** [0.078]** [0.072] [0.088]* [0.080] [0.074]*** [0.088]** [0.077]* [0.100] [0.081]*** [0.080]** [0.106] [0.113]*** [0.111]*** [0.138] 
Observations 3423 2696 2835 3393 2614 3463 3336 2718 2745 2619 3417 2820 2680 1723 3030 3418 2696 
Pseudo R² 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Log likelihood -4415.21 -3505.3 -4066.91 -4814.39 -3647.88 -4631.43 -4553.66 -3611.01 -3665.5 -3755.19 -4739.99 -3916.54 -3417.34 -2287.13 -3888.93 -4544.16 -3505.31 
 
Ordered probit weighed estimates - Robust standard errors in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Gender, age, years of education (level and squared),  economic condition, marital 
status city size, erceived country situation, attitude towards market, month of interview, and year controls included 
.
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Figure 1 – Estimates of the impact of education and socio-economic level on support to 
privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
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Note: probit weighed regression, including gender, age, age², marital status, employment conditions, opinions about the 
country situation and the effectiveness of the market, city size, month of interview, country and year dummies. 
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Figure 2 – Estimates of the impact of education and ownership of durables on support to 
privatization – Latin America 1998-2000-2002 
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Note: probit weighed regression, including gender, age, age², marital status, employment conditions, opinions about the 
country situation and the effectiveness of the market, city size, month of interview, country and year dummies. 
 
